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DIVINE BENEVOLENCE

ASSERTED;

AND VINDICATED FROM

THE OBJECTIONS

OF

ANCIENT AND MODERN SCEPTICS.

67889

By THOMAS BALGUY, D.D.

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Πάντων μὲν ἡγεμὼν ἀγαθῶν, πάντων δὲ πατὴρ καλῶν,
ἐκεῖνός ἐστι, καὶ φαῦλον οὐδὲν ποιεῖν αὐτῷ θέμις, ὥσπερ
οὐδὲ πάσχειν, ΑΓΑΘΟΣ γάρ ἐστι.

Plut. Non posse [illegible] vivi [illegible] E

ADVERTISEMENT.

THE following Treatiſe is a ſpecimen of a larger work on the ſubject of natural religion: why publiſhed at this time, will be too eaſily conjectured.

This ſubject is reducible to three general heads: God's being, his perfection, his moral government.

I. To prove the *being* of God, is to prove the exiſtence of a wiſe and benevolent Author of Nature. The name of GOD would be improperly applied, either to an *unconcerned* ſpectator of natural events, or an *undiſcerning* cauſe, or a *malevolent* author, and contriver, of them. The idea therefore ſignified by this name, includes the three attributes of *power*, *wiſdom*, and *goodneſs*.

Power and wiſdom will appear in a moſt amazing degree, if *each* part of the univerſe

proceed from an *intelligent* cauſe, and *all* its parts from *one* and the *ſame* cauſe.—Goodneſs is the ſubject of the following papers.

II. To prove the *perfection* of God, is to prove that he unites in himſelf every *kind* and *degree* of theſe attributes, which really *exiſts* in the univerſe; and this, without any limitation of *time* or *place*.

I ſay not, that he poſſeſſes all *conceivable* power, &c. for we are very apt to *miſconceive*. I *need* not ſay, that he poſſeſſes *infinite* power, &c. for this expreſſion has no other meaning than what has already been pointed out.

III. On the ſubject of God's *moral government*, it ought to be ſhewn,

1. That men are *actually* under divine government.

2. That the laws of this government are *moral*.

3. That the laws are *imperfectly* executed.

4. That the ſeeming defects and errors of God's *preſent* government will be ſupplied and corrected in a *future ſtate*.

On the *laſt* of theſe heads God has not ſeen fit to give us that full and deciſive evidence, which our fond imaginations might lead us

to expect. *Nature* indeed ſuggeſts the *hopes* of future happineſs. But it was reſerved for the *Chriſtian revelation* to bring *life and immortality to light.*

The beſt *foundation* for ſuch hopes, as may be derived from *natural* appearances, would be laid in the following propoſitions:

1ſt. That men will continue to *exiſt* after death, and will continue *ſubject* to God's *moral government.*

2dly. That their preſent and future exiſtence are parts of *one ſcheme.*

3dly. That this ſcheme will either continually *approach* to perfection, or become, in time, *abſolutely perfect.*

From this ſketch the reader will underſtand, that the reflections laid before him, however imperfect, are no haſty production; but the reſult of care and thought. Poſſibly the outlines here drawn will, at ſome time or other, be filled up.

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DIVINE BENEVOLENCE ASSERTED, &c.

THE divine goodneſs is conſidered by ſome writers as conſiſting wholly in *benevolence*: by others, as comprehending ſome other moral perfections, not perhaps reducible to this head. But the idea of benevolence is by all writers *included* under that of goodneſs; and is at leaſt a very affecting and intereſting part of it: and this only is the ſubject of the following diſquiſition.

That the Author of Nature has been influenced by a benevolent principle, both in framing and preſerving the univerſe, is uſually proved from the degree of happineſs *actually* produced in this ſyſtem; or at leaſt from the *prepollency* of good. But this argument alone may not perhaps give intire ſatiſ-

faction to a ſcrupulous inquirer. If we conſider the good *only*, excluſively of the evil, our premiſes will be too narrow to ſupport our concluſion. If we conſider *both*, we may more eaſily ſatisfy ourſelves, than prove to the conviction of others, that the good exceeds the evil.

There are indeed writers of great authority, who think we may *demonſtrate* the goodneſs of our Creator from the marks and effects of goodneſs diſcernible in his works. When this is once done, we need not, they ſay, pay any regard to contrary appearances; for that difficulties are not to be urged againſt demonſtration.—Certainly they are not. But in the preſent caſe, it is to be feared, the term is miſapplied. For we ſhall not be juſtified, on any ſound principles of logic, in drawing an univerſal concluſion from a partial and imperfect view. The intention of our Maker is to be collected from the *whole* ſyſtem of nature; ſo far at leaſt as falls within our obſervation: not from detached parts of it. We have no right therefore to form any judgment about it, till the *evils*, as well as the *goods*, of life, have been fully conſidered.

The other method of arguing, viz. from the *prepollency* of good, ſtands indeed on a wider, but not perhaps a ſurer, bottom. It is difficult for a man to eſtimate any *ſingle* pleaſure or pain, felt by another man: ſtill more difficult to compute the *ſum* of his pleaſures or pains, and then to balance the account. How then ſhall we be able to eſtimate the clear amount, whether of happineſs or miſery, among the whole race of mankind; eſpecially if it be conſidered, how very ſmall a part of our ſpecies falls directly under our obſervation?

It may be more ſatisfactory then to conſider ſeparately the various *cauſes* of pleaſure and pain: and to examine how far theſe oppoſite *effects* were *deſigned* or *accidental*; i. e. whether either or both were *ultimate ends* *. If the conſtitution and laws of *every* part of nature appear ultimately intended to produce good; it cannot but be the joint intention of *all* the parts. Nor ſhall we have any ſuffi-

* By the word *ultimate* we only mean the laſt *diſcernible* intention. Our preſent ſtate *may* have reference to other ſtates and other ſyſtems. But this being unknown, proves nothing for, or againſt, the divine goodneſs.

cient reaſon to reject this concluſion, if many of the phænomena, not all, ſhew an intention of producing good: and *no* part, or circumſtance, ſhew an intention of producing evil except only in *ſubordination* to good; which, to the purpoſe of our preſent inquiry, is in truth no exception at all.

Not only we may diſcover the intention of nature by contemplating the ſeveral *parts* of the univerſe, and the *reſpective* laws to which each of them is ſubject: but the more *general* laws, which extend through God's *whole* adminiſtration, may with great probability be urged as proofs of good or of evil intention.—Even the propriety of governing *at all* by fixed and ſettled laws, is a very material ſubject of inquiry: and it may alſo ſeem to many both a doubtful and an important queſtion, how far it is conceivable, that a benevolent author of nature ſhould permit the good effect of theſe laws to be *oppoſed* and *defeated* by the folly and perverſeneſs of human agents. When theſe inquiries are finiſhed, we ſhall then come with advantage to conſider the actual *reſult* of the various branches of divine adminiſtration.

PART I.

INTRODUCTION.

THE ſame obſervations, which ſhew, that the phænomena of nature are produced with deſign, uſually determine in each particular caſe *what* that deſign was. But, the particular effects being innumerable, the immediate ends of them muſt be alſo innumerable. Theſe effects however being many of them ſimilar, the ends propoſed muſt be alſo ſimilar. Theſe ends then, as well as the phænomena themſelves, are capable of being reduced under certain *general heads:* that is, they may be diſtributed into various *claſſes*, like effects, or like ends, being thrown into the ſame claſs. It is thus we determine the *laws* which direct the conſtitution of nature, as well as the *views* with which it is ſo conſtituted and governed.

As a great number of theſe general *laws* may often be reſolved into one ſtill *more* general; ſo a number of *deſigns* may be alſo referred to a yet *higher* deſign, in which they are all included: and it is the buſineſs of philoſophers to reduce both to as few and as ſimple principles as they can.

We are firſt then to reduce the various intentions diſcernible in the conſtitution and courſe of nature to a few general principles; and then to comprehend theſe, if that appear to be poſſible, under one *more* general and ſimple principle.

Now the various intentions diſcernible in the works of Nature, are all reducible to theſe two;

1. To produce a regular ſucceſſion of men and animals; including the birth, temporary preſervation, decay, and diſſolution of each individual.

2. To furniſh them with the means and occaſions of exerciſing their various powers of perception and action.

It will appear from a very ſlight induction, that theſe intentions concur in the various works of nature; and it will alſo appear; that the firſt is ſubordinate to the ſecond.

PARTICULARS

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Very many *vegetables* are relative to theſe purpoſes; being deſigned in part for the ſubſiſtence of men and animals, and in part for the various uſes of life.

2. *Foſſils* and *minerals* were deſigned for the uſe of man *.

3. *Springs* and *rivers* are deſigned for the ſubſiſtence and uſe both of men and animals; for promoting alſo the fertility of the earth, i. e. the production of vegetables; and in this way alſo for the ſervice of men and animals.

4. The *earth* was deſigned for an habitation to men and animals: alſo for the production of foſſils, minerals, vegetables.

5. The *ſea* was deſigned as a habitation for innumerable tribes of fiſhes; for the production alſo of vapours, which fall in rain, producing vegetables for the uſe of men and animals.

6. The *ſun* and *moon* are both mediately and immediately neceſſary for the ſubſiſtence and uſe of animals, and eſpecially of men.

* So ſays Cicero (de Nat. Deor. lib. II. c. 64) Nec vero ſupra terram, ſed etiam in intimis ejus tenebris plurimarum rerum latet utilitas; quæ, ad uſum hominum orta, ab hominibus ſolis invenitur.

7. The formation of *men* and other *animals* was plainly intended for the temporary production of ſenſe and motion; for continuing theſe powers during a limited time of uncertain extent; for tranſmitting them in ſucceſſion from one individual to another.

With what view now are theſe ſeveral ſucceſſions of men and animals produced and preſerved? Doubtleſs with a deſign that they ſhould *live*; *i. e.* perceive and act in various ways. And to what purpoſe are the ſeveral individuals deſtroyed? Without queſtion, to make way for others, that theſe alſo may perceive and act. There may indeed be *other* intentions. But this, *of itſelf*, will account for all the phænomena. For the deſign of cauſing a variety of perceptions and actions, evidently includes and preſuppoſes the deſign of producing and preſerving; and a deſign of tranſmitting life to a new race of beings, equally includes the deſign of removing, if not of deſtroying, thoſe which already exiſt on the ſame globe.—*Perception* then and *action*, in various kinds, include all the known intentions of the Author of Nature.—But this

this perhaps may require farther illuſtration. Let us then conſider the ſubject a little more particularly.

1. An animal body is a machine endued with various powers of ſenſe and motion; and many of the parts of which it conſiſts (perhaps all of them) are ſubſervient either to the *exiſtence* of theſe powers, or to the *uſe* of them.

2. It is a general law of the animal creation, that theſe powers muſt be *exerciſed* in order to their preſervation; not only becauſe they are ſtrengthened by a proper uſe of them, but becauſe, if we ſhould neglect to uſe them, life itſelf could not be ſuſtained; the motive powers being evidently neceſſary for obtaining thoſe gratifications of ſenſe, which are the means of ſupporting the whole machine, and ſo of continuing the powers thus employed.

3. But, as Nature has provided for the employment of theſe powers with a view to their continuance, ſo alſo for their continuance with a view to their actual employment.

4. Yet it would be abſurd to ſuppoſe that theſe ends are reciprocal. To ſay we exiſt merely

merely for the ſake of perception and action, yet perceive and act for the ſake of continuing our exiſtence, is to ſay, that the animal machine is formed for no purpoſe at all. One of theſe ends muſt be *principally* intended; the other purely *ſubordinate.*

5. It would be abſurd to ſuppoſe that the end principally intended is preſervation; and that perception and action are ſubordinate to it: for this is only to ſay, that theſe effects are conſtantly produced, for the ſake of making it *poſſible*, that they ſhould be *repeated.* Whereas, if the *actual* repetition of them be indifferent, the poſſibility of repetition can be no purpoſe at all.

6. The powers however of ſenſe and motion may both be conſidered as occaſions of our preſervation, and alſo as occaſions of our pleaſures and pains; and the pleaſures and pains reſulting from them either as *ſubordinate* to our preſervation, or as being themſelves the *principal* ends, for the ſake of which we are produced and preſerved. For there is no abſurdity in ſuppoſing, that the very ſame ſenſations, which were principally intended, ſhould alſo be made ſubordinate to

our

our preſervation, and ſo become the occaſions of reproducing themſelves.

In conſequence of theſe remarks we may now ſet aſide the firſt of thoſe general intentions, which were above pointed out, and conſider *perception* and *action* as the *ſole* ends (within the compaſs of human reaſon) propoſed by the Author of Nature.

But we may advance one ſtep farther than this. For the actions of men and other animals are the *cauſes* of perception to the agent and to others; and are frequently alſo the cauſes of production, preſervation, and deſtruction. Theſe then are to be conſidered as *ſubordinate* to perception, which we may fairly conclude to be the ultimate end in the contemplation of our Maker.

The only queſtion remaining is, What *kind* of perception was intended by the Author of Nature, whether pleaſant, or painful, or both.

Now the fact is, that men, and all other animals, have perception of *both* kinds; and from the frame of their nature, and the circumſtances in which they are placed, ſuch perceptions muſt have been foreſeen. But, conſiſtently

conſiſtently with this fact, and the foreknowledge of it, three ſuppoſitions may be made:—

1. That the pleaſures and pains, ariſing from the conſtitution of Nature, were *equally* intended by its author: *i.e.* he was induced to make things, as they are, by *both* motives; or both pleaſure and pain were *ultimate ends*. On this ſuppoſition God is a *capricious* being.

2. That the *pleaſures only* were intended; and that the pains are accidental conſequences attending the means of producing pleaſure: *i. e.* the pains ariſing in the preſent ſyſtem of things are *not* ultimate ends; but unhappy appendages of a ſcheme formed with no other deſign then the production of good. On this ſuppoſition, God is a *benevolent* being.—Or

3. That the *pains only* were intended; the pleaſures being nothing more than accidental conſequences of the means uſed for cauſing pain: *i.e.* the pleaſures are not ultimate ends, but neceſſary parts of a ſcheme deſigned purely for the production of evil. On this ſuppoſition God is a *malevolent* being.

Now, previous to a particular enquiry, we may point out perhaps ſome circumſtances, which

which will form a ſtrong preſumptive proof in favour of the *ſecond* of theſe ſuppoſitions.

1. It is more probable that God is *good* than *capricious*; becauſe the courſe of nature is *uniform*. Whatever events befall us, good or bad, ariſe from certain *general* principles in the conſtitution and government of the univerſe. Now, from the nature of a world ſo framed, and a government ſo conducted, many events would be likely to happen, contrary to the intention of its Author. But it is *not* likely, that a capricious Being ſhould be conſtant and uniform in his methods of acting; when the ends of his adminiſtration would be at leaſt equally well anſwered by variety and diſorder.

2. It is more probable, that God is *good* than *evil*. For evil, as far as we can judge, is more likely to be *accidental*. This appears from experience in the conduct of men; who uſually act with a deſign of producing good either to themſelves or to others. The evil they do is often indeed foreſeen, but ſeldom deſired or purſued as the ultimate end of action. This analogy is not to be ſlighted. Whoever admits the uſual proofs of a

deſigning cauſe of the univerſe, muſt allow us to argue, ſo we do it with proper caution, from *human* deſigns to *divine*. But there is ſtill ſomething more in the caſe here. For the production of good requires *uniform* conduct: and he who acts by rule will of courſe ſometimes produce effects *not intended*. The intention therefore of producing good may, by accident, occaſion evil. But the *contrary* intention will ſcarce ever occaſion good: becauſe evil, for the moſt paſt, may eaſily be produced, without obſerving any rule at all; and often the *more* eaſily on that very account.—Add to this, that a good deſign is in every view more *difficult* to be executed, than an evil one; and therefore is more likely to be executed *imperfectly*: i. e. with a mixture of effects foreign to the deſign or oppoſite to it*. It

* When theſe papers were firſt drawn up, it was believed, that the three ſuppoſitions above-mentioned were the only ſuppoſitions which could poſſibly be made by one who admits the unity of God. But a late writer has invented a fourth, viz. that *neither* our pleaſure nor pains were ultimately intended by the Author of Nature. He is ſuppoſed to be void of benevolence and void of malice.—This is totally repugnant to all the experience *we* have of the conduct of intelligent beings. Could it be admitted at all, it would, in a great degree, ſubvert the evidence of a deſigning cauſe

It is perhaps needleſs to obſerve that all this reaſoning preſuppoſes the divine UNITY: a truth, as it ſeems, eaſily deducible from the *ſimilitude* of deſign, and the *unity* of deſign, which appear in the works of nature. But this ſubject is not within the compaſs of our preſent inquiry.

We may now therefore proceed more directly and particularly to examine and lay open the ſubject before us—viz.

Whether the ſeveral parts of the univerſe, and the laws to which they are ſubject, were deſigned by the author of them for the production of Good. In other words, whether the ſucceſſive exiſtence, perceptions, and actions, of the various animals which inhabit the globe, and the cauſes on which they depend, all of them proceeding from the *intention* of their maker, be reducible to a *higher*,

cauſe at the head of the univerſe; a concluſion, which reſts on this principle, that *uſefulneſs* is a mark of deſign.—It is true, indeed, that men, in moſt of their deſigns, mean only to be uſeful to *themſelves*: and, in ſome of them, aim at *miſchief* to others. But *all* their deſigns have a view to the *feelings* of ſenſible Beings; and we cannot ſo much as imagine an elaborate ſcheme to be formed and executed, without even a wiſh, that any perſon living ſhould either be the better or the worſe for it.

or

or *more general* intention, viz. the production of happineſs.

Now, 1. The *birth* and *preſervation* of animals *may* be referred to this end, or may, with equal probability, be referred to an oppoſite end; viz. the production of miſery. For neither happineſs nor miſery can be produced, unleſs animals *begin* to live and *continue* to live. The judgement therefore to be formed on this part of the conſtitution of things depend on the *ſtate* and *condition* allotted to ſenſible Beings in the preſent ſyſtem. If they are intended for a happy ſtate, their production and preſervation were inſtances of goodneſs; if for a miſerable ſtate were inſtances of malevolence. Birth and Preſervation are neither good nor evil.—In like manner

2. The *death* of animals is, *of itſelf*, neither good nor evil: not to the individual, unleſs you previouſly determine, whether its life were happy or miſerable; not to the ſpecies on *any* ſuppoſition. For there is juſt as much benevolence in communicating happineſs, and as much malevolence in communicating miſery, to a *ſucceſſion* of Beings, as in confining

confining it perpetually to the *ſame* Beings. What one loſes, another gains.

To judge then of the general principle, which includes all the ends diſcernible in the conſtitution of things, we muſt conſider the nature and condition of men and other animals, during their abode on this globe: i. e. whether their frame and circumſtances be adapted to make them happy or miſerable. —In the purſuit of this inquiry it will be fit to conſider, 1. The conſtitution of the bodies of animals: 2. The external cauſes which are capable of affecting them: 3. The powers and faculties of the human mind: 4. The mutual dependence of men and other animals. 5. The mutual dependence of mankind.

PREVIOUS REMARK.

An intention of producing good will be ſufficiently apparent in any particular inſtance, if the thing conſidered can neither be changed nor taken away, without loſs or harm, *all other things continuing the ſame*. Should you ſuppoſe *various* things in the ſyſtem changed *at once*, you can neither judge of the poſſibility, nor the conſequences, of the change, having no degree of experience to direct you.

This remark is to be carried along through the *whole* proof of divine benevolence.

I.

Of the bodies of men and other animals.

Theſe may be conſidered in two views: either in reference to preſervation and deſtruction, or to ſenſe and motion.

1. *Of preſervation and deſtruction.*

I. That nature has uſed fit means for the preſervation and ſucceſſion of animals, is, as we have juſt ſeen, no argument of benevolence. The appetites therefore, which are given for that purpoſe, determine nothing. Whatever end be propoſed by the author of nature, Individuals *muſt* be preſerved, and the ſpecies continued. On ſuppoſition therefore of good, or of ill, deſign, hunger, thirſt, &c. are equally neceſſary.

II. On the other hand, the *inſufficiency* of theſe means is no argument of malevolence. Thus the frailty of our bodies, which makes them in many ways liable to deſtruction, and ſure of being deſtroyed in time, will evidently determine nothing in the preſent queſtion.

For this only ſhews, that the life of each individual was deſigned to have *ſome limit*, and that limit *uncertain*: a deſign, at leaſt equally conſiſtent with a good or evil principle of action.

But tho' no concluſion can be drawn from the *accompliſhment* of theſe ends, or the *degree* in which they are accompliſhed; yet the *manner* of doing it may furniſh us with ſome remarks.

III. When we conſider the ſubject in this view, two circumſtances eſpecially may ſeem to deſerve our notice.

1ſt. That all animals are intruſted with the care of preſerving *themſelves*, and continuing their *ſpecies*.

2dly. That we are excited to diſcharge theſe offices by reward and puniſhment.—Thus the neglect of taking ſuſtenance is puniſhed by the ſenſations of appetite: either neglect or exceſs is puniſhed by ſickneſs: inattention to danger by external pains. We are often too reſtrained from the uſe of improper food by diſagreeable ſenſations.* On the

* See Butler's Analogy, Part I.

other hand, all the gratifications of ſenſe within certain limits, may be conſidered as rewards.

Now the *firſt* of theſe circumſtances will determine nothing. For it has only theſe two effects; to make our exiſtence more *precarious*, and to give occaſion for the exerciſe of our *active* faculties. Indeed, *both* circumſtances are included under certain general laws, to be conſidered hereafter, viz. That the happineſs of men, and other animals, is made to depend on their *actions*; and that they are obliged to *perform* theſe actions under the *double* ſanction of rewards and puniſhments.

At preſent therefore I ſhall only ſtay to obſerve, that the *rewards*, by which we are led to uſe the means of preſervation, &c, are a ſtrong preſumption of benevolence. Preſervation indeed and ſucceſſion were equally neceſſary on either ſuppoſition; and the acts, of which we are ſpeaking, are the neceſſary means, by which thoſe ends are to be obtained. But the pleaſures attending them are *not* neceſſary. The appetites *alone* may ſeem to have been a ſufficient inducement. Whatever pleaſure therefore we find in gratifying them, beſides the removal of an uneaſy ſenſation, is

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a good plainly *intended* for us by the Author of Nature. The ſenſes, which produce this pleaſure, *could* not have been ſpared, without leſſening our happineſs: and *might* have been ſpared, without diſcouraging us from preſerving ourſelves and continuing our ſpecies. It is clear, therefore, that the Author of Nature deſigned, in this inſtance, to add to our happineſs.

Can a ſimilar argument be uſed to eſtabliſh the *oppoſite* concluſion? I think not. But it will be more convenient to defer this ſubject, till we come to ſpeak of the *more general* laws of divine adminiſtration. One objection however occurs, which it may be proper juſt to touch upon in this place.

Obj. It is alleged, that the uneaſy ſenſation of appetite, in many caſes, ſtill continues, after the wants of nature have been ſupplied; i. e. when it becomes uſeleſs or hurtful; and that, on the other hand, agreeable perceptions are often annexed to *exceſſive* gratification.

Anſ. To this objection I ſhall only anſwer at preſent, that we are in no ſort competent judges, how far it was *poſſible* for the palates and ſtomachs of animals to be differ-

ently framed. We complain perhaps of an evil, which admits no remedy; or none but what is worse than the disease.

What more remains to be said on the subject will fall under *another* general law of our nature; viz. That we are often excited to *hurtful*, as well as beneficial, actions.

IV. But as the means of *preservation* furnish no proof of benevolence; so neither do the means of *destruction* furnish any proof of an *opposite* principle. It is only the *manner* in which we are destroyed, on which any argument can be founded. On this head three things are observable; that the time of dying is various and uncertain; that it may be hastened or delayed by the act of the animal itself, or of other animals; and that death is usually preceded by pain and sickness.

1st. The first of these observations affords an instance of benevolence. For the constant foresight of death would render life unhappy *.

2d. The second of them is included in

* Οἶμαι δὲ κ) τὴν φύσιν, ὁρῶσαν τότ' ἄτακτον, κ) βραχυχρόνιον τῷ βίῳ, ἄδηλον ποιῆσαι τὴν τὲ θανάτῳ προθεσμίαν, τοῦτο γὰρ ἦν ἄμεινον. Εἰ γὰρ προήδεμεν, κᾶν προεξετήκοντό τινες ταῖς λύπαις, κ) πρὶν ἀποθανεῖν, ἐτεθνήκεσαν. Plut. Conf. ad Apoll.

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thoſe very general laws, to which we have often occaſion to refer, that the happineſs of men is made to depend on their actions, and the happineſs of one man on the actions of another.

3d. Nor can it be ſaid that the third affords any juſt preſumption of malevolence. For pain and ſickneſs inform us of our danger: prevent us from increaſing the miſchiefs, which threaten us, by our own miſconduct: and often too give room for proper care and fit remedies, by which our lives may be prolonged. This conſtitution therefore ſerves to lengthen the time of our exiſtence; and, if our ſtate here be, on the whole, a deſireable ſtate, contributes to our good *.

It ſeems then that the methods uſed by nature, for preſerving and deſtroying animal bodies, afford ſome proof of benevolent intention, none of the contrary.—Let us hear, however, what may be urged on the other ſide.

Now, allowing that pain is uſeful, by giving us notice of our danger,

* Μὴ γὰρ νοσοῖμεν—νοσήσασι δὲ παρίη τις ἀίσθησις ἤτ' ἂν τέμνοιτό τι τῶν ἡμετέρων, εἴτ' ἀποσπῶτο. Τὸ γὰρ ἀνώδυνον τῦτο ἐκ ἄνευ μεγάλων ἐκγίνεται μισθῶν τῳ ἀνθρώπῳ. Plut. Ib.

Obj. 1. It may be ſuppoſed perhaps, that ſome *other* kind of notice might have been given, and ought to have been preferred. But this ſuppoſition, being wholly imaginary, without any ſort of foundation to reſt upon, may be ſafely paſſed over.

Obj. 2. It may more plauſibly be alleged, that the notice is often given, where it muſt needs prove *ineffectual.* For the uneaſy ſenſations, deſigned for our preſervation, are felt *univerſally*; even in theſe inſtances, where we *cannot* be preſerved. But,

1ſt. How do we know that it was *poſſible* for the uneaſy ſenſations to be confined and reſtrained to thoſe particular caſes, in which they are capable of producing their full effect? or, if poſſible, that ſuch reſtraint would not have been attended with greater loſs or harm?

2dly. We may obſerve, that, as knowlege increaſes in the world, the number of *remedies* increaſes, both againſt outward pains and ſickneſs: and that the pains men ſuffer, make them more cautious, and more attentive to diſcover *new* remedies. Fewer inſtances therefore are likely to occur hereafter, in which theſe admonitions will prove ineffectual:

fectual: and the time *may* come, when the effect of them will become *conſtant*; and no ſpecies will remain of painful accidents either inevitable or incurable.

3dly. The *general* principle, of annexing pain to the means of deſtruction, evidently tends to our preſervation: and it is this general tendency, of which we now inquire. As to the *conſtancy* of the laws of nature, in this inſtance and in others, it will be the ſubject of a diſtinct inquiry.

Obj. 3. Though neither the uncertainty of life, nor the penalties by which men and other animals are compelled to preſerve it, afford any evidence of malevolence, when taken *ſeparately*; yet taken *together*, they afford a ſtrong proof of malevolent intention. For the frailty of our bodes *continually* expoſes us to danger; and therefore we need *frequent* admonitions, i. e. frequent pains. God therefore *intended* that our preſent condition ſhould be exceedingly liable to pain.—But,

1ſt. To make this objection concluſive, it muſt be ſuppoſed, that ſome *change* could be made in the bodies of animals, which would

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render them *leſs* frail than they are, without deſtroying the means of their preſervation and happineſs; a ſuppoſition altogether deſtitute of proof.

2dly. Though our bodies are made *liable* to pain, yet *actual* pain cannot, with any degree of propriety, be conſidered as an object of divine intention. For, if you conſider ſeparately the parts of an animal body, each will appear to be *intended* for ſome uſeful end. There is no evidence that any of them were framed on *purpoſe* to give pain, or on purpoſe to be put out of order. Whenever ſuch diſorders happen, they may always be referred to ſome general principle, of apparent utility in other inſtances.

Obj. 4. It would be better for us, that the accidents, which cauſe our deſtruction, ſhould be without pain and without remedy, than that we ſhould be continually expoſed to ſuch a variety of evils, as a warning only to preſerve ourſelves.—But,

Anſw. This objection preſuppoſes, what is at leaſt uncertain, that the ills of life exceed the goods. For, if life be deſireable upon the whole, it is eligible to ſuffer thoſe pains,

pains, which are the means of prolonging it.—This may not indeed be applicable to every individual. It is enough, if it hold good with regard to the *uſual* ſtate and condition of ſenſible beings.

The chief obſervations which have occurred to us on this ſubject, may be ſummed up in one general argument; which will be diſpatched in a few lines.

Our nature contains *various* capacities of enjoying pleaſure, which appear in no reſpect neceſſary for any *bad* end. But it contains *no* capacities of ſuffering pain, which are not apparently neceſſary for ſome *good* end. *Uſeleſs evil* is a thing never ſeen, unleſs in ſuch inſtances, as are comprehended under a principle *generally* uſeful. Our nature therefore affords *ſome* evidence of an intention to produce good: *no* evidence, ſo far as we have yet ſeen, of any intention *terminating* in evil.

2. *Of ſenſe and motion.*

I. The bodily *ſenſes* afford a preſumptive proof of benevolent intention. They are means of pleaſure and of information. Not one

one of them can be taken from us, without evident loſs and harm.

Some of them give *immediate* pleaſure, as the ſmell and taſte: others may be conſidered as *avenues* of pleaſure, as the ſight and hearing, which lead us to the more refined enjoyment of beauty and harmony*. All of them introduce ideas, the materials of *mental* pleaſures: all of them enable us to obtain pleaſure, and avoid pain, by informing us of the occaſions of each.

Our capacity of perceiving pain cannot be urged in abatement of this evidence. Even the *diſagreeable* ſenſations, as we have already ſeen, are not without their uſe. They inform us uſually, what would be prejudicial to us, and ſerve to put us on our guard. No man therefore would wiſh to be without them.

* Primum enim *oculi* in his artibus, quarum judicium eſt oculorum, in pictis, fictis, cœlatiſque formis, in corporum etiam motione, geſtu, multa cernunt ſubtilius: colorum etiam atque figurarum venuſtatem atque ordinem, &, ut ita dicem, decentiam, oculi judicant.—*Auriumque* item eſt admirabile quoddam, artificioſumque judicium, quo judicatur——varietas ſonorum, intervallu, &c. quæ hominum ſolum auribus judicantur. Cic. de Nat. Deor. lib. ii. c. 58.

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We have no ſtronger inſtance of benevolence among men, than the affection of parents to their children. And, would not every parent wiſh, that his children may have their ſenſes compleat? Would he chuſe, that any part of their bodies ſhould be inſenſible of pain? Certainly not. We ſee then, that a benevolent affection would lead us, if we ourſelves were to determine, to produce animal bodies with the ſame powers of ſenſation, which are given by the Author of Nature. We have reaſon therefore to conclude, that *he* alſo acts with benevolent intention.

II. The *motive* powers of the body are evidently uſeful. Without them we ſhould want a conſiderable part of our active faculties; and be unable to procure the objects, which gratify our ſenſes.

Let it be remembered, however, that the powers of ſenſe and motion are not conſidered here, as means of *preſervation*, but as means of procuring and enjoying a variety of pleaſures not *neceſſary* to us, and of avoiding pains not *deſtructive* to us. Though the capacity of preſerving ourſelves ſhould prove nothing; yet the capacity of enjoying theſe additional

additional pleaſures will evidently prove a benevolent deſign; for it will prove a deſign of giving a *happy* exiſtence, diſtinct from the general intention of providing the *means* of exiſtence. So alſo every faculty, by which we are enabled to avoid pains *not deſtructive* to the body, ſhews, that theſe pains are contrary to the divine intention; and conſequently, that this intention was benevolent.

II.

Of the external cauſes, which are capable of affecting animal bodies.

Theſe may conveniently be claſſed under two heads: on one hand the cauſes of preſervation and pleaſure; on the other, of deſtruction and pain.

1. *Of preſervation and pleaſure.*

On this head we muſt purſue the ſame courſe of reaſoning as we did on the laſt.—— It is an undoubted fact, that nature has made a ſufficient proviſion for the ſuſtenance and preſervation of animals: ſo that all of them are capable of obtaining thoſe objects, which

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are requiſite for the ſupport of their lives.—But this fact, of itſelf, proves nothing. It *could* not be otherwiſe than it is, whether the intention of our Maker was good or evil.

It is more material to obſerve, that the cauſes of preſervation are *alſo* cauſes of pleaſure; and that various means of pleaſure are provided, no ways neceſſary to our preſervation.—Thus the ſeveral ſorts of *food* are made agreeable to the palate; of *flowers* to the ſmell; of *ſound* to the ear; of *viſible* objects to the eye: and many alſo of the works of nature are *beautiful*, as well as uſeful; and furniſhed with ſuch qualities, as enable men, in various ways, to multiply their pleaſures, and live conveniently and happily.—Now all theſe means of happineſs are preſumptions of benevolence. For they apparently tend to produce pleaſure; and have no apparent ill tendency in any way whatever.

Obj. It may be ſaid indeed, that theſe external advantages are too *ſcarce* for the uſe of *all*: nay that a very great part of mankind have comparatively but a ſmall ſhare. But,

1ſt. We may obſerve, in anſwer to this objection, that *many* conveniences are *not*

ſcarce *. Even the loweſt order of men poſſeſs more than is neceſſary for their ſubſiſtence, and have alſo real and conſtant pleaſure in the uſe of thoſe things which their neceſſities require: greater perhaps than often falls to the lot of thoſe who are more plentifully provided. Now, this is enough to prove a benevolent intention. The objection only ſhews, if it ſhew any thing, that we can *conceive* a conſtitution of things, in which *greater* benevolence would have appeared: a concluſion with which we have at preſent no concern.

2dly. Thoſe conveniences which are ſcarce, are not the moſt *important* to our happineſs. Often indeed they derive all their value from their ſcarcity †. To make them common, would be to make them contemptible.

3dly. Scarcity is only a relative term, importing that ſome have more than others.—

* Paſſim jacent *alimenta*, quæ rerum natura omnibus locis depoſuit. (Sen. de Conſ. ad Helvid. c. 9.)

And again (c. 11.) Nihil homini natura, quod *neceſſarium* faciebat, fecit *operoſum*.

† O miſerabilis, quorum palatum, niſi ad *pretioſos* cibos, non excitatur! pretioſos autem non eximius ſapor, aut aliqua faucium dulcedo, ſed raritas et difficultas parandi fecit. Ib. c. 9.

But this circumſtance is of no weight in the preſent queſtion. For there may be juſt as much benevolence in an unequal, as an equal, diſtribution of things. It may ſtill be true that God is kind to all, tho' ſome have received peculiar marks of kindneſs.

4thly. The word *ſcarcity* is alſo relative to human *deſires*. There is much want among the rich: much content among the poor. The objection amounts only to this, that men have *ſome* deſires not ſatisfied; i. e. that they are *not contented*.—But the means are in their own power *.

5thly. That very inequality of which we complain, conduces to the general happineſs. The ſuppoſition of univerſal plenty is inconſiſtent: for it would prevent *labour*, the *neceſſary* means of plenty.

But this very circumſtance may be thought by ſome to be a freſh cauſe of complaint. It has been called a *hardſhip*,

Obj. 2. That the advantages of life are

* Cupiditati nihil ſatis eſt: naturæ ſatis eſt etiam parum. (Sen. de Conſ. ad Helvid, c. 11.) Again: Non fortunæ iſte vitio, ſed ſuo, pauper eſt.—Animus eſt, qui divites facit. See alſo the ſtory of *Apicius* (c. 10.) cui ſeſtertium centies egeſtas fuit. I nunc & puta *pecuniæ* modum ad rem pertinere, non *animi*.

not uſually to be obtained without *induſtry*.

In anſwer to this objection, it might be ſufficient to refer the reader to that general law of our nature, which makes the happineſs of men depend on their actions. But a more direct anſwer ſhall be given under the following obſervations:

1ſt. That induſtry is *no evil*, unleſs by accident. Both the mind and body are ſo framed, that a proper exertion of their faculties is not attended with pain; ſo that there is no *general* inconvenience in annexing this condition to the acquiſition of good.

2dly. In thoſe caſes, where inconveniences ariſe from exceſſive application, *ſome* compenſation is made by the ſubſequent pleaſure of *reſt*.

3dly. That conſtitution of things which makes induſtry neceſſary, tends to *prevent* evil, not to produce it. For want of employment would, in many different ways, make men unhappy.

4thly. The exerciſe of our various faculties, whether for attaining the neceſſaries or pleaſures of life, is naturally *pleaſant*. Many indeed of our higheſt enjoyments con-

ſiſt in action. Therefore this conſtitution of things, by engaging us to act, promotes our happineſs.

5thly. The *improvement* of our faculties depends on the exerciſe of them; and, without queſtion, the *more* they are improved, the greater good we derive from them.—And,

6thly. It may be juſt worth mentioning, that good things, of whatever kind, obtained by our own induſtry, give us peculiar pleaſure.

They who are not convinced by theſe reaſons, may attend, if they pleaſe, to the moſt faithful pictures, that are extant, of human life. *Poets* perhaps may deſcribe it more juſtly than *Philoſophers*. To *Virgil* * therefore and *Milton* † let the appeal be made. You may expect in them to find the ſubject adorned and embelliſhed. But you cannot ſuppoſe their deſcriptions to be *oppoſite* to truth, and directly repugnant to that *nature*, which they profeſs to imitate. See then whether the *labours of the country* are painted by thoſe inimitable writers in the ſame frightful forms,

* Georg. lib. 2. † L'Allegro.

under which they appear in the writings of ſceptical philoſophers. On the contrary, chearfulneſs and innocence are the moſt ſtriking features in the admirable portraits they have given us. The huſbandman and ſhepherd are repreſented as happy even in their daily *toils*; and happy too in the *reſt* which ſucceeds them.—We are told indeed, that induſtry is but ill ſuited to the natural *indolence* of man. But it may be ſaid, with greater appearance of truth, that idleneſs is ill ſuited to his natural activity. If ſome men are too indolent; others are too buſy. The generality *love* to be employed: and they, whoſe condition in life places them above the *neceſſity* of labouring, uſually impoſe on themſelves a *voluntary* labour, in one kind or other, under the name of *pleaſure*.—One would have thought, that men who have a taſte for French books, and French manners, could not have been altogether unacquainted with the ſentiment of *ennui*; of which that reſtleſs people talk ſo much, and which, above all things, they profeſs to dread.

Obj. 3. Induſtry itſelf is not *ſecure* of its reward. The man who labours to ſupport himſelf

himself and his family, may yet want not only the pleasures and conveniences, but even the *necessaries* of life.

This circumstance however affords no presumption of malevolence. For,

1st. According to the *general* course of nature, industry is the appointed means of obtaining all the advantages of life: and here, as in other instances, we are to judge of a design from its regular and *customary* effects. The exceptions only shew, that it is *imperfectly* executed.

2dly. The wants, which arise from these accidental disappointments, are not unfrequently the occasion of good: as affording room for beneficent actions, which, in many different ways, promote our happiness.

But it is needless to pursue this objection any farther. For this seeming irregularity proceeds from two causes, to be considered in another place: viz. the mutual dependence of mankind, and the uniform government of the material world.

2. *Of destruction and pain.*

1. Experience shews, that a variety of external causes are capable of *destroying* us. In the air, lightning, cold, heat, pestilence; on

the earth, poiſons, wild beaſts, ſerpents: under the earth are laid up the materials, which produce eruptions, and earthquakes: the water alſo may be fatal to land-animals: accidental cauſes are innumerable. Every part of nature contains, as it were, the ſeeds of deſtruction.

It is needleſs to inſiſt on the poſſible, or probable, uſes, which ſome, or all, of theſe things are capable of ſerving. At all events they afford no preſumption of malevolence. For all animals are deſigned to *die*: the *manner* of dying is immaterial.

2. It is equally evident, that many external cauſes are capable of producing *pain*. But it is not evident, and not probable, that any one of them was *deſigned* to produce it; unleſs with a view to our preſervation and happineſs. In many inſtances pain gives us notice of danger; the reſt are accidental conſequences of good general laws; of laws which cannot be altered without greater harm.

On the whole, we may affirm, that the inanimate parts of the creation furniſh us with many advantages, not apparently neceſſary to any *ill* deſign: and expoſe us to no diſadvantages, but what are either directly

ſubſervient

ſubſervient to *good*, or accidental conſequences of *laws* evidently beneficial. They afford therefore *ſome* preſumption of benevolence, *none* of malevolence.

It may not perhaps be uſeleſs, in this place to recollect the circumſtances, within and without us, which have afforded us preſumptions of divine benevolence. The force of them in this contracted view may more diſtinctly appear.

RECAPITULATION.

1. The *Appetites* and *Senſes*, being immediately neceſſary to the preſervation of the individual, and continuance of the ſpecies, are ſo far no marks of benevolence. But the capacities we enjoy of receiving *agreeable* ſenſations imply a *farther* deſign than this. For the ends juſt mentioned might have been as fully accompliſhed by painful ſenſations only; or, it may be, without any ſenſations at all. Whereas,

1ſt. The gratification of our *appetites* not only removes pain, but gives poſitive pleaſure.

2dly. The ſenſes of *ſight* and *hearing* are avenues both to their proper pleaſures, and to others; as of beauty, and harmony.

3dly. All the ſenſes enable us to *find* and to *attain* objects of agreeable ſenſation, and to avoid the contrary.

It is needleſs to apply this reaſoning to our motive powers. They are not only neceſſary to our preſervation, but they contribute greatly to our pleaſure.

We conclude therefore, on the whole, that the conſtitution and frame of our bodies affords a ſtrong preſumption of benevolence.

11. In like manner, the correſponding proviſion of *external* things may alſo be conſider'd as neceſſary to the preſervation of life. We could ſcarce ſubſiſt, eſpecially in the colder climates, if materials were not provided us for clothes and houſes: and we are incapable of ſubſiſting at all without food.

But, tho' no concluſion can be drawn from the bare ſupply of our neceſſities, yet the *liberal** ſupply of them is a conſideration of

* Sed illa quanta benignitas naturæ, quod tam *multa* ad veſcendum, tam *varia* & *jucunda*, gignit? neque ea uno tempore anni, ut ſemper & novitate delectemur & copiâ. Cic. de Nat. Deor. lib. ii. c. 53.

Neque enim *neceſſitatibus* tantummudò noſtris proviſum eſt, uſque in *delicias* amamur. Sen de Benef. lib, iv, c, 5.—But ſee the whole of the 4th, 5th, and 6th chapters.

great

great weight. The proviſion, which is made, of a variety of objects, *not* neceſſary to life, and miniſtring only to our pleaſures; and the properties given to the neceſſaries of life themſelves, by which they contribute to pleaſure *as well* as preſervation: theſe things plainly ſhew a farther deſign than that of giving us exiſtence; a deſign of giving us a *happy* exiſtence.

III.

Of the human mind.

The faculties of the mind may not improperly be reduced to three; the underſtanding, the will, and the paſſions.

1. *Of the underſtanding.*

1. This word, in its wideſt ſenſe, comprehends all the various modes of thought: viz. the powers of imagining, remembering, comparing, compounding, abſtracting.—Theſe are indifferent in their application; being occaſions, as it may happen, either of pleaſure or pain. Yet ſince the manner of applying them depends on our own

choice; and it is moſt likely we ſhould chuſe to employ them for our own benefit: they are ſo far preſumptions of benevolence in the Author of Nature.—Thus, for *inſtance*,

Imagination is of evident advantage to us. For, beſides that it has ſome pleaſures peculiar to itſelf, it is the neceſſary *means* both of obtaining pleaſure, and avoiding pain; without it, no ſchemes could ever be formed for the direction of our conduct.

The *memory* of paſt events helps us to judge of future; and to diſcern the conſequences of different ways of acting, propoſed to our deliberation.

The powers of *comparing*, *compounding*, and *abſtracting*, are many ways uſeful to us; particularly as to them we owe the ineſtimable advantages of *ſpeech* and *reaſon**; by which

* Jam verò *animum* ipſum *mentemque* hominis—ex quo *ſcientia* intelligitur, quam vim habeat, qualis ſit: quâ ne in Deo quidem eſt res ulla præſtantior. Cic de Nat. Deor. l. ii. c. 59. And again, Jam verò domina rerum—*eloquendi* vis, quam eſt præclara, quamque divina? Ib.

The whole of this chapter, and the two next are much to the purpoſe. Pope and Bolingbroke have paid little attention to a diſcourſe as beautiful as is juſt.

we

we are enabled both to form deſigns and to execute them.

Add to all theſe powers the *aſſociation* of ideas: on which ſeveral of the preceding operations depend; and which therefore cannot but be beneficial in its *general* influence, tho' in ſome particular inſtances it may chance to miſlead us.

In general, we may conclude each of theſe faculties to be advantageous, becauſe the want of any of them would be eſteemed a great loſs, and the perfection of all extremely deſireable.

11. Underſtanding, in the more confined ſenſe of the word, is the name of that faculty by which we are enabled to form true conceptions of the parts and properties, eſpecially the *relative* properties, of objects preſented to our view: either on the one hand by *analogical* reaſoning, grounded on the teſtimony of ſenſe, or on the other hand by *demonſtrative* proof grounded on intuition.

This faculty, at leaſt ſome degree of it, is neceſſary for the preſervation of life. But this could not be the *whole* intention of it. It was

was evidently deſigned to promote the *happineſs* of life. For,

1ſt. It is the ſource of a *peculiar* pleaſure, attending the purſuit and diſcovery of truth.

2dly. It is the neceſſary inſtrument of *action*. Without it we ſhould act in vain, or in ways deſtructive to our happineſs. By it we diſcern the methods of avoiding evil and obtaining good.

3dly. This faculty contributes greatly to our happineſs by making one man agreeable and uſeful to another.

But the true value of it may beſt be eſtimated by the misfortune of *loſing* it. Few perſons, on this head, would be of the ſame mind with Him in the poet, who thought it an injury to be reſtored to his right ſenſes.

2. *Of the Will.*

This faculty alſo was *intended* for our good; and is therefore an inſtance of benevolence in the Author of our beings. For,

1ſt. That conſtitution of nature, which makes us *active* beings, enables us to follow the

the dictates of the underſtanding; and by ſo doing, both to avoid evil, and to obtain good.

2dly. We feel a peculiar ſatisfaction from ſucceſs in either kind, when we are conſcious of owing it to our own conduct. Whatever advantages we acquire by ſkill, or induſtry, or virtue, give us double pleaſure on reflection.

3dly. Action itſelf conſtitutes a main part of our happineſs. There is a ſingular pleaſure in chuſing for *ourſelves*, and in proſecuting the objects of our choice.

4thly. *Virtuous* actions give ſtill a ſuperior happineſs; both from our conſciouſneſs of deſert, and the approbation we obtain, or think we obtain, from other intelligent beings.

Obj. It may be alleged perhaps, that the *imperfection* of human underſtanding, and the *uncertainty*, which attends the determinations of the will, leave every man's happineſs in a *precarious* ſtate. The *fact* cannot be diſputed.—The *account* of it will fall more conveniently under another head. It may be better however to run the hazard of ſome repetition, than to paſs it over intirely in this place.

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The objection, when fully ſtated, will ſtand thus.

That conſtitution of nature, which makes us intelligent and free beings, is the occaſion of evil as well as good; perhaps of *more* evil than good. For men hurt, by the abuſe of their faculties, both themſelves and others: they have *peculiar* pain too from the ſufferings they bring on themſelves; and they are expoſed to remorſe and infamy from acting againſt the intereſts of ſociety.—It may ſuffice, at preſent, to anſwer to this objection, that,

1ſt. *More* of men's actions are beneficial, than hurtful.

2dly. The benefit was *intended* by the Author of Nature, the harm was *not* intended. For the harm, as will appear afterwards, always ariſes from the abuſe of ſome beneficial principle. The *general* frame and conſtitution of our nature, with the ſituation and circumſtances in which we are placed, *incline* us to a *right* uſe of our faculties.

3dly. The power of being happy or miſerable, *as we will*, is more likely to be the gift of a good than an evil being. For all

men

men *deſire* happineſs. Therefore all are likely to *purſue* it.

If any force remain in this objection, it belongs to another head: namely, the *temptations* by which men are led to act wrong. The *power* of acting either conſtitutes or cauſes our higheſt enjoyments: and is not, of itſelf, any cauſe at all of miſery.—Leaving then this part of the objection to its proper place, we need only obſerve that the *poſſible* abuſe of our faculties is by no means to be put in competition with the good they actually produce. No man, I ſuppoſe, would willingly be deprived of them, to avoid the danger of ſuch abuſes.

3. *Of the paſſions.*

The various modes of pleaſure and pain which ariſe from imagination or reflection, are ſometimes diſtinguiſhed into *internal ſenſes affections*, and *paſſions*. There is no great uſe in the diſtinction; and great difficulty in applying it, ſo as to refer every ſentiment to its proper claſs. I ſhall therefore comprehend them all under the general name of *paſſions**.

* See a ſlight theory of the paſſions at the end of this treatiſe.

Now

Now the powers we poſſeſs of receiving pleaſure or pain *inaifferently*, by means of reflexion, may be conſidered as preſumptions either of benevolence or malevolence, according as the *conſequences* reſulting from ſuch ſenſations are beneficial or hurtful. But it ſhould not be forgotten, that we receive ſome pleaſures on reflection, which have *no pains* to balance them.—Such are the pleaſures received *directly* from all objects, either of imagination or underſtanding, which appear *great*, *beautiful*, or *new*.—Such alſo are the pleaſures received *indirectly* from the various modes of *imitation*, conſtituting what are called the *liberal arts*. The oppoſite ſenſations, if there be any, are too inſignificant to deſerve notice.

The moſt obvious diviſion of the *paſſions* is into thoſe which reſpect *ourſelves* and thoſe which reſpect *other men*: and theſe laſt again may be diſtinguiſhed into *ſocial* and *malevolent* paſſions. To theſe ſeveral claſſes muſt be ſubjoined the *moral ſenſe*, the appointed guide of them all.

1. *Of*

1. *Of the ſelfiſh Paſſions.*

1. *Self-eſteem*, and its *oppoſite*, are probable means of *pleaſure*. For every man has it in his power to enjoy the one, at leaſt ſome degree of it, and to avoid the other.

They are alſo evidently *uſeful*: by exciting us, on the one hand, to enlarge our capacities of doing good, and to apply them properly; on the other, to forbear all ſuch conduct as might diſable us from being uſeful to ourſelves and others. Theſe ſentiments, when properly regulated, differ but little from what is called a virtuous *pride*, and a virtuous *ſhame*.

Suppoſe a *contrary* conſtitution. Suppoſe the ordinary frame of the human mind to be, what we ſometimes obſerve in very uncommon perverſions of it. Suppoſe that every man valued himſelf in proportion to the inſignificance or the hurtfulneſs of his character, and could not reflect without bluſhing on his inclination or ability to do good—It is eaſy to ſee what muſt be the conſequence.

2. Selfiſh *deſires*, and *averſions* may in general be conſidered as uſeful and neceſſary.

They excite us to uſeful actions, and reſtrain us from hurtful ones.

In regard to the *objects* of theſe paſſions, it muſt be remembered, that all our deſires aim either at pleaſure and the means of producing it*, or the means of removing and preventing pain. Hence,

1ſt. The deſire of *property*.---This inclination gives riſe to almoſt all the *buſineſs* tranſacted in private life: i. e. cauſes all the happineſs, ariſing from the induſtry of private men.

2dly. The deſires of *dominion*, and *liberty*.—The former encourages men to expoſe themſelves to fatigue and danger for the ſervice of others: the latter is a check on thoſe who have *acquired* dominion, and diſcourages them from abuſing it.

3dly. The deſire of *honour*. This paſſion is many ways uſeful to mankind.

1 It excites us to *deſerve* honour, by acquiring the ability, and improving the diſpo-

* The *cuſtomary* means. Theſe, from aſſociation, become objects of deſire, even when the pleaſing effect is no longer expected. Thus men deſire *fame*, and, in ſome ſort they deſire *property*, even after death.

ſition, which nature has given us, to pleaſe and to benefit other men.

2d. It renders men *dear* to each other, if they make a proper uſe of it; and ſo increaſes their propenſity to acts of kindneſs and benevolence.

—On the other hand,

3. It reſtrains them from ſuch conduct, as would render them odious or contemptible; ſuch as might either tend to produce evil, or leſſen their capacity of doing good.

Our averſions are aimed againſt pain and its cauſes, or againſt thoſe cauſes which are deſtructive of pleaſure. Hence,

Death is, of courſe an object of averſion; a conſtitution plainly tending to our preſervation, and probably to our pleaſure.

It is needleſs to purſue the other objects of theſe paſſions; which are juſt as many as the different kinds of ſenſation, and the different cauſes of each.

Something however muſt be ſaid of their general *laws*: the principal of which are theſe three.

1ſt. They depend jointly on our opinion of the *probability* of an event, and of its *efficacy* in producing pleaſure or pain. Deſpair kills de-

ſire.—This occaſions us to apply our endeavours, where they may be uſeful; and to forbear fruitleſs purſuits. At the ſame time it ſets us free from uſeleſs uneaſineſs.

2dly. They are more forcibly excited by *particular* pleaſures and pains, than by general views.—Theſe laſt are of uncertain effect, leaving too much to the determination of reaſon; and could not ſo ſafely have been truſted by nature in ſome of her moſt important operations.—The obſervation is peculiarly applicable to ſuch deſires as are founded on bodily appetites. The paſſions grafted on theſe appetites, and aiming at particular objects, are much more violent, and ought to be ſo, than the calm deſire of our general intereſt and happineſs.

3dly. They are more forcibly excited by *near* than diſtant objects.—The former are more likely to be within the reach of our endeavours. The next claſs of paſſions are,

3. Selfiſh *joy* and *ſorrow*.—Theſe are indifferent at leaſt; as only ſerving to enlarge the ſphere of our pleaſures and pains. Nor do

theſe

theſe *pains* afford any ſort of preſumption againſt the divine benevolence. For they are conſequences of the powers of *anticipation* and *memory*, both beneficial: together with the power of feeling uneaſineſs from paſt or future events; which is alſo beneficial, ſince without it neither anticipation nor memory could influence the will. It is to be conſidered therefore as an *accidental* ill conſequence of a good general conſtitution.—Indeed theſe powers cannot be taken away without an intire ceſſation of human action.

Sorrow too, in many kinds, has its *immediate* uſe; more perhaps than ſufficient to be weighed againſt it. For, while kept under proper regulations, it is a powerful excitement to *action*; prompting us to a vigorous exertion of our faculties, that we may procure either remedies or compenſation.

2. *Of the ſocial and malevolent paſſions.*

1. *Reſpect* and *love* are uſeful by rewarding and encouraging men's ability and inclination to do good.

Reſpect affords an encouragement to the acquiſition of uſeful talents: reſtrains men from giving offence, and excites them to pleaſe thoſe, who are able to ſerve or to hurt them.

Love, in *general*, is a pleaſing ſentiment, and is alſo a cauſe of benevolence.—The particular *kinds* of love are evidently beneficial.

1ſt. *Conjugal* love promotes the ends of marriage: reſtrains men's deſires to a ſingle object, and rewards their fidelity. By theſe means it promotes ſuch an intercourſe between the ſexes, as is moſt beneficial to ſociety.

2dly. *Parental* love rewards the care and fatigue of the parent in providing for his offſpring, as well as in preſerving and educating them. By theſe means help is obtained for thoſe, who moſt want it.—It is obvious too, that the affections of children to parents are not *reciprocal*. This would have been an unneceſſary precaution: for the parent uſually wants not the aſſiſtance of the child.

3dly.

3dly. Love, arising from any kind of personal *merit*, is an encouragement to merit: and love to *benefactors* rewards and encourages beneficence.

4thly. Love of *acquaintance*, besides that we may suppose it to be included under the last head, makes men most *inclined* to do good, where they are most able to do it: and encourages, because it rewards, a frequent intercourse among them.

2. *Contempt* and *hatred* discourage and punish men's inability to do good, or their inclination to do harm.

Contempt gives uneasiness to the objects of it: and this uneasiness excites them very powerfully to remove the cause of it; by correcting, so far as they can, the qualities which produce it, and acquiring some degree of credit and consideration in the world.

Hatred, though a painful, and sometimes a hurtful, sensation, yet in the intention of nature is beneficial.—For,

1st. A general hatred of *bad men* is a constant discouragement to hurtful actions.

2dly. Hatred ariſing from *perſonal* injury is a defence to each individual. For both the hatred itſelf and its conſequences ſtrike a fear into thoſe, who *wiſh* to injure.

3dly. *No* ſuch paſſion *uſually* ariſes towards *benefactors* or *ſtrangers*, where it would be evidently hurtful: it ariſes only on the appearance of *harm* done or intended, or good neglected to be done; in which caſes it muſt be generally beneficial.

There is only one exception to this rule, viz.

Hatred, ariſing from competition, or compariſon. But this ſeems only an accidental conſequence of a good general conſtitution. For hatred *uſually* ariſes, and ought to ariſe, towards thoſe who give us *pain*: though, in this particular inſtance, the good effect of it may appear more doubtful than in others.—It is not however altogether without advantage: as ſerving to increaſe *emulation*; i. e. a laudable deſire of raiſing ourſelves to a level with others, if not of ſurpaſſing them in uſeful talents.

3. *Benevolent*

3. *Benevolent* desires and aversions, with the hopes and fears, joys and sorrows, that attend them, are a very material part of this subject. The *general* utility of these sentiments admits of no dispute; they give every man an *interest* in the happiness of others, and by consequence excite him to do good, and to forbear evil.

The particular *laws* of this passion are also beneficial.—Thus,

1st. *Compassion* is made stronger than the opposite sentiment. For the *miserable*, not the happy, need our assistance.

2dly, Compassion itself is not *invariable*. The *feelings* of it decrease, as the *habits* produced by it increase: i. e. the uneasy sensation is made to abate, in proportion as it becomes less necessary.

3dly. The *opposite* sentiment is also variable; but in a contrary direction. The pleasure we feel from the happiness of others *increases* with our habits of beneficence.

4thly. The pain of compassion is attended with agreeable reflexions. We are told by an excellent judge, that the very *tears* of virtue

are

are pleaſing: and this pleaſure is, in moſt caſes, ſufficient to balance the pain; and prevent us from checking a ſentiment ſo useful to ſociety.

5thly. Benevolence is produced and increaſed by reſpect and love: it is leſſened or deſtroyed by contempt and hatred. This conſtitution ſerves to mark out *particular objects* of our affection: which would otherwiſe be weak, becauſe it would be general. And that theſe objects are *properly* marked, no one can doubt, who conſiders the *cauſes*, on which the paſſions abovementioned are found to depend. By them we are prompted to do good to thoſe who beſt deſerve or moſt want it; and to *attempt* good, where our endeavours are moſt likely to ſucceed.

4. *Malevolent* deſires and averſions, tho' always painful, and ſometimes hurtful, yet, in the intention of nature, are beneficial.—The ſame cauſes which produce *hatred*, produce *ill-will*, which is the conſequence of hatred: and both theſe paſſions, under proper regulations, promote the general good.

When

When we wiſh ill to others from a principle of *indignation* againſt vice, or even *reſentment* of perſonal injuries; the ſentiment leads us to promote the intereſts of ſociety by oppoſing or puniſhing bad men.

When our ill-will proceeds from competition; it ſtimulates us the more to acquire thoſe advantages to ourſelves, for which we *envy* others: or to avoid the diſadvantages, which in them we behold with pleaſure. And this was pretty plainly the intention of nature. For, *independently* of ſuch competition, the pleaſure of others gives us *no* pain, & v. v.; unleſs in perſons whom we are uſed to conſider as private or public enemies: nor do we feel in *any* caſe the ſentiments of envy and malice, where thoſe ſentiments would be altogether *uſeleſs*; as, for inſtance, when we reflect on the talents or ſucceſs of others, in circumſtances totally *unlike* our own.

Obj. But whatever advantage may ariſe from our malevolent paſſions, they are ſuppoſed to give unneceſſary pain, and to occaſion unneceſſary miſchief: for that the ſelfiſh and ſocial paſſions, under the direction of reaſon,

reaſon, are ſufficient for producing the ſame ends. Our regard to others, as well as ourſelves, will excite us to repel or puniſh hurtful actions; and our reaſon will enable us to diſcern the conſequences of ſuch actions, and to guard againſt them.

In anſwer to this objection, it is to be obſerved,

1ſt. That men *will not* be engaged by theſe motives, to repell or puniſh ill actions, when the miſchief to be expected from them is either *diſtant* or *general*.

2dly. That theſe motives, if they wait for the direction of reaſon, will operate too *ſlowly*, and ſo the opportunities of exertion will often be loſt.

3dly. That the reſiſtance and puniſhment may often be prevented by the *oppoſition* between ſocial principles and ſelfiſh.

4thly. That men are likely to be reſtrained from proſecuting or puniſhing offenders by *indolence* and *compaſſion*.

5thly. That the ſuppoſed utility of malevolent paſſions is fully confirmed by experience.

ence. In the present state of things, *neglect* in resisting or punishing is just as frequent, as *excess*. Remove the influence of indignation and resentment, and it will become much *more* frequent, evidently to the harm of society.

I am sensible, after all, that a writer must lie under great disadvantage, who speaks one word in favour of such odious passions, as *hatred* and *malevolence*. But are not men misled in this instance, as in others, by the imperfection of *language*? A good man, it is supposed, *never hates*, never bears *ill-will* to his neighbour. But the fallacy lies here, that when these sentiments are confined within reasonable bounds, the obnoxious *names* are not given them. Sure it is, that no human breast is free from them; and were they totally banished the world, the mischiefs of such a change would probably be more, and greater, than is usually apprehended.

3. *Of the Moral Sense.*

This *sentiment* (it is seldom, I confess, called a *passion*) is undoubtedly beneficial. When applied to ourselves, it rewards our virtues,

or

or puniſhes our vices. When applied to others, it directs our love and hatred, our benevolence and malevolence, to proper objects.

But it is chiefly important, as applied to ourſelves: by exciting us to gratify our benevolent inclinations, and rewarding our compliance; and by diſcouraging us from giving way to other inclinations, when they interfere with theſe: alſo by deciding the conteſt between inconſiſtent paſſions, and enabling us to preſerve our minds in tranquillity: alſo by making our conduct *uniform*; that the occaſional impulſes of paſſion may not engage us in contrary purſuits, and unavoidable diſappointments: laſtly, by increaſing our attention to diſtant and general objects, and repreſſing the violence of particular deſires and averſions, which might lead us to neglect our true happineſs.

Some perſons, miſled, I ſuppoſe, by the abuſe of words, allow no ſuch ſentiment to *exiſt* in the human mind. But no one, we may preſume, who admits the *reality*, will diſpute the *uſe* of it.

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Not only the ſentiment itſelf, but the *degree* of it, is what it ought to be. We may imagine perhaps that a *higher* degree would be ſtill better; a more effectual guard to our own virtue, and a more powerful reſtraint on the conduct of other men. But, ſuppoſing only our underſtanding and paſſions to continue the ſame in *all other* reſpects, the change propoſed would be a change for the worſe. For it would render our eſteem of others very difficult, and our ſelf-eſteem impoſſible. Should you think to avoid this inconvenience by increaſing only the ſenſe of *moral good*, without increaſing the ſenſe of *moral evil* (a thing perhaps impracticable), men would become leſs cautious of their conduct, and leſs attentive to their moral improvement. But this is a ſubject to be reſumed in another place*.

* Some writers have imagined, that no concluſions can be drawn from the ſtate of the paſſions for, or againſt, Divine Benevolence; becauſe they are not *innate*, but *acquired*. This is frivolous. If we are ſo framed, and placed in ſuch circumſtances, that all theſe various paſſions *muſt* be acquired; it is juſt the ſame thing as if they had been planted in us originally. It is true, indeed, they may fall into an *unnatural* ſtate; a ſtate contrary to their *uſual* courſe, and to the intention of our Maker. But that is quite another matter; and will immediately come under a diſtinct conſideration.

Having

Having thus gone through the conſideration of the *ſeveral* paſſions, it may be proper to attend to the objections which are made to *all* of them. Of theſe the moſt material are the two that follow.

Obj. Firſt, that all our paſſions, even while they remain in their *natural* ſtate, often give occaſion to wrong *conduct*. For that they excite indifferently in *all* circumſtances, even in thoſe where they are not to be gratified without damage to ourſelves or others.

But to this objection there needs no other anſwer, than that God governs the world by general laws; a point to be conſidered at large hereafter.

Obj. 2. It is alledged that all our paſſions are liable to *abuſe*; and that ſuch abuſe gives occaſion to great miſchief, both private and ſocial. The fact indeed is certain; but the objection may be anſwered in various ways.

1ſt. The *power* of abuſing our paſſions is a part only of that general diſpenſation, which makes human happineſs depend on human conduct.

2dly. The *actual* abuſe proceeds in a great degree from the *imperfection* of our *underſtanding*

ing; a circumstance, as will afterwards appear, of no weight in the present question.

3dly. These abuses appear to be *accidental* only, not intended by the Author of Nature *. Nay, they are plainly *contrary* to his intention: and one part of the harm arising from them serves as a *penalty*; obliging men, in some degree, to *restrain* such abuses in themselves and others. Now, it is from the *customary* and natural state of the passions, not from occasional variations, that we are to collect the design with which they are given us.

4thly. Even these accidental abuses are often *remedied*. For the abuse of one passion frequently corrects the abuse of another: and the excess of a passion in one person frequently balances the defect of it in another.

5thly. The *general* state of the passions is what it ought to be. The *direction* of each is usually right: and the *degree* of each is comparatively right. No one can be considerably weakened, through the whole human species, without great harm, supposing all the

* Non idcircò (Cic. de Nat. Deor. lib. 3. c. 28.) non optimè nobis à Diis esse *provisum*, quod multi eorum beneficio *perversè* utuntur.

reſt to remain as they are. Nor is the force of the paſſions too great, when taken *all together*. Were the amount of them leſs, tho' the whole race of mankind, and we were to approach ſo much the nearer to the apathy of the Stoics: this ſuppoſed reformation of our nature would neither make us more uſeful nor more happy; but, on the contrary, would deprive us of the chief joys of life, and the moſt powerful ſprings of human action *.

We have now gone through our enquiry into the various powers of the human mind; and have examined ſeparately, what preſumptions they afford of good or ill intention in the Author of Nature: and the reſult has been, that the underſtanding, the will, and the paſſions, are each of them adapted to good *ends*, tho' *accidentally* indeed the occaſion of evil. Yet this, it ſeems, is not ſufficient. There are ſome writers who object to the frame of our nature, not on account of its *unfitneſs*, but its *imperfection*. I will firſt ſtate the objection, and then examine the force of it.

* Ἀφαιρήσεται γὰρ ἡμῶν ἅπαν τὴν ἐκ τοῦ φιλεῖσθαι καὶ φιλεῖν ἡδονὴν, ἣν καὶτοὺς μάλλον διασώζειν ἀναγκαῖον. Plut. Conſ. ad Ap.

General

General objection.

It is alledged, that our *bodies* are exceedingly *frail*; ſo that our happineſs is in continual danger of interruption from external accidents; ſome from our own miſconduct; ſome from the miſconduct of others; ſome without any fault, either in us or them. Now why, it is ſaid, are we expoſed to ſo much hazard? Why placed within the reach of innumerable cauſes of miſchief, which we are too blind to avoid, and too weak to withſtand? Even with the utmoſt care and vigilance, it is many times impoſſible for us to eſcape them, or to ſupport ourſelves under them. Yet God might, if he had pleaſed, hav eſecured us from them all. He has *not* pleaſed: therefore he is not benevolent.

The mind too, we are told, as well as the body, is manifeſtly defective. Its powers are contracted and limited, to a degree which defeats, in a great meaſure, the main ends for which they are ſaid to have been given us.—Our *reaſon*, we know, is often unable to direct us to what is good: often expoſes us to

miſtakes, which lead to evil *.——The *moral faculty* itſelf is liable to be *miſled* by ſuch miſtakes. Even when it is rightly directed, it is *inſufficient*; being too weak to prevail againſt the appetites and paſſions. Now all the conſequences of this imperfect conſtitution were diſtinctly foreſeen by the *Author* of it; and he might, if he had pleaſed, have given us ſo high a degree of underſtanding as would have rendered us infallible; and ſo quick a moral ſenſe as would have rendered us impeccable. Yet, tho' he *ſaw* the miſchiefs which would ariſe from human imperfection, and might have prevented them, he did not *chuſe* to prevent them. The ill therefore which followed was *intended* by him: and it may reaſonably be concluded, that he framed and conſtituted us as we are, with a *deſign* of making us vicious and miſerable.

I believe it will not be denied, that I have given this objection its full force. Yet we

* Sentit domus uniuſcujuſque ſentit forum ——ut, quemadmodum ratione recte fiet, ſic ratione peccetur. See this, and much more, alledged by Cotta in Cic. de Nat. Deor. lib. 3. c. 27.

Again (c. 31.) In hominum vitiis ais eſſe culpam. Eam dediſſes hominibus ratione, quæ vitia culpamque excluderet.

ſhall ſoon ſee, that it has no force at all, but what ariſes from preſumption and folly.

For in the firſt place, the objectors will never be able to prove, what they aſſert with the utmoſt confidence, that God *might* have made us more perfect than we are. Moſt ſure it is, that he can do all things poſſible. But are *we*, in any degree, competent *judges* of the bounds of poſſibility? We can hardly ſtir one ſtep farther than we have *experience* for our guide. When this guide fails us, we have no bottom to ſtand upon; unleſs we will truſt to a principle very apt to miſlead us, that whatever man can imagine, God can effect. But,

2dly, If we allow them the poſſibility of greater perfection, they will ſtill be unable to prove the *expedience* of it. For who can take upon him to ſay, that the production of a *leſs perfect* being may not be beſt for the *univerſe?* We ſee, in this ſyſtem, the advantage, and even neceſſity, of *ſubordination*. May it not be equally neceſſary to the good of the whole? We need not indeed to ſtop here. For,

3dly, It *may* be beſt for man in particular, that his *firſt* ſtate ſhould be an imperfect one. This appears probable even from analogy.

Men would be unfit for the part allotted to them in their *riper* years, if they were not trained up in the diſcipline of *childhood*. May not, in like manner, the *whole* of our preſent life be a ſtate of diſcipline? a neceſſary preparation for a higher ſtate? If ſo, our complaints will amount to nothing more, than that we are children firſt, before we are men,—Nay, thoſe very imperfections, of which we complain, are, in one view, of *evident* importance to us: I mean, as they afford room for the acquiſition of virtuous habits; habits of *reſolution* and *attention*. Attention could have no place at all, if our judgement were infallible; for perfect ſecurity excludes all care: and *reſolution* would be uſeleſs, if we had no difficulties to ſurmount. And may not the virtues, which are thus acquired, be the neceſſary foundation of our ſupreme happineſs? May not our paſſing with prudence and fortitude thro' the uncertainties and dangers of this preſent ſtate, be the neceſſary means of attaining that *higher* degree of perfection, to which we ignorantly and preſumptuouſly put in our claim, before we are qualified to receive it? It is plainly *not* the method of nature.

ture, in other parts of the creation, to obtain her ends *instantaneously*. Perhaps therefore perfection *cannot* be thus attained; but men must be gradually formed to that capacity and temper, which are to make them happy for ever.

Even if all these conjectures should fail (which are surely more probable than any thing that can be set against them), still the argument alledged will be found inconclusive, For,

4thly. The evils to which we are exposed in this imperfect state appear to be *accidental*, not natural, effects of our frame and condition. Every part of the body, and every faculty of the mind, was evidently *designed* for the good it produces: but there is no appearance that any of them was designed to produce evil; both because the production of evil affords a less *certain* proof of intention, and because also it is less *frequently* produced by any assignable principle in human nature *.—Let us suppose

* Thus, for instance, the *stomach* was designed for digestion, not indigestion; the *eyes* for seeing, not for smarting; the *feet* for walking, not for the pains of the gout.

ſuppoſe however, for a moment, that the ills of life were actually *included* in the divine intention; yet this hinders not, but that our nature may have been conſtituted by a wiſe and good being. For,

5thly, Should we admit, that the bodies of men *might* have poſſeſſed a greater degree of ſtrength and firmneſs, without loſs or harm in any other reſpect; yet our preſent *frailty* will prove only a *limitation* of benevolence, not a total *want* of it, in the Author of Nature. Should we admit farther, that our intellectual and moral powers *might* have been advanced to a higher degree of perfection, without defeating any good purpoſe whatever; yet the defects of which we complain, will only ſhew a *deficiency*, as we might fancy, in the divine goodneſs: they will afford no preſumption of *malevolent* intention. It avails nothing to ſay, that this imperfect conſtitution gives occaſion to *evil*. For it was *kindneſs*, not malice, to intend a *mixed* ſyſtem with a ſupe-

So again the paſſion of *ſhame* was deſigned to prevent diſgraceful actions, not ſurely to influence an unhappy mother to the murder of her own child.

rior-

rior tendency to good: juſt as much as to produce a *ſmaller* degree of good, unmixed with evil; which, I preſume, no one would have denied to be a clear proof of benevolence. If you require all the ill to be removed, and yet *all* the good to continue; you require in effect *more* good, i. e. a higher degree of benevolence. But the arguments, by which we prove the Divine Benevolence to a certain degree, are not overturned by objecting, that a *greater* degree is conceivable. I am now arguing on the very unreaſonable ſuppoſition, that human conception is the meaſure of divine power. Yet the objector, when poſſeſſed of every advantage which this ſtrange ſuppoſition can give, has no way of ſupporting himſelf, but by an argument as void of ſenſe as it is of gratitude; "God has given us *nothing*, becauſe he has *more* to give:" an argument, which proves equally againſt *every* imaginable condition of being; and therefore proves, in reality, againſt *none*.

"Not ſo, it will be ſaid, for God may, if he pleaſes, give *all*: may totally *exhauſt* his own power by forming the *beſt ſyſtem poſſible*.

Had

Had he done this, there would have been nothing left either to aſk or to wiſh."—But neither will this ſuppoſition have any better ſucceſs in eluding the force of our preſent argument.

For why may we not ſay, with the philoſophers of a neighbouring nation*, the beſt ſyſtem poſſible has *actually* taken place? Let him, that *can*, comfute the aſſertion. While it remains *unconfuted*, it will be found an invincible obſtacle to all arguments againſt the goodneſs of God.

We might here conclude this branch of our inquiry; but the ſubject of human nature is ſo very important, that it may not be improper to collect ſome of the preceding obſervations into a ſingle point of view. For this purpoſe the following ſhort abſtract is laid before the reader. It is chiefly taken from a book leſs known, and leſs valued, than

* See the *Theodicée* of M. *Leibnitz*: with whom alſo agrees Balbus in Cic. de Nat. Deor. l. 11. c. 34.

Cujus quidem adminiſtratio nihil habet in ſe quod reprehendi poſſit: ex iis enim naturis quæ erant, quod effici *optimum* potuit, effectum eſt.

it

it deſerves, Mr. Hutcheſon's Treatiſe on the Paſſions.

Remarks on the utility of our ſenſes and paſſions.

1. The appetites of hunger, thirſt, ſleepineſs, prevent us from neglecting the means of preſervatn; inform us of the times, when theſe means are to be uſed; and overcome our averſion to labour in the attainment of them.

2. The appetites of the ſexes prevent us from neglecting the means of continuing the ſpecies; and overcome the apprehenſion of expence and trouble in the care and education of children.

3. The ſenſe of external pain is, in a good meaſure, neceſſary to reſtrain us from hurting ourſelves: the pains of ſickneſs, to put us on ſeeking for proper remedies. Nor is the degree of theſe pains too acute. For we ſee, in fact, they are not always *ſufficiently* acute, to anſwer their ends compleatly.

4. The *various tribes* of ſelfiſh affections and paſſions are all the reſult of theſe few neceſſary

ceſſary principles: and therefore this part of the conſtitution of our nature affords us no arguments againſt the benevolence of its Author.

5. Were the *ſelfiſh* appetites and paſſions left alone, we ſhould be greatly indiſpoſed to acts of beneficence, and frequently engaged in acts of a contrary tendency. They are properly balanced therefore by a *ſympathy* with others: whence it comes to paſs, in a variety of caſes, that *their* intereſts become *ours*; and excite ſimilar paſſions in our minds. This ſympathy is ſtrongeſt where it is moſt needful: i. e. in the *misfortunes* of others. The pain we feel from *compaſſion* is of evident advantage to mankind.

6. The oppoſite paſſion of *reſentment* is neceſſary to reſtrain injuſtice, (the effect of ſelfiſh paſſions frequently, and ſometimes of *ſocial*) by making it dangerous to the aggreſſor.

7. *Shame* and *remorſe* either reſtrain us from ill conduct, or lead us to repent and reform. They cannot be thought too ſtrong. For they are often found ineffectual.

8. Any

8. Any increaſe of the *ſelfiſh* paſſions, without a higher degree of underſtanding, would make men unfit for ſociety: and, on the other hand, an increaſe of the *ſocial* paſſions would qualify us to be heroes of romance, rather than reaſonable beings.

IV. *Of the mutual dependence between man and other animals.*

Men unqueſtionably receive benefit, in various ways, from the brute creation: and they, in return, from the ſkill and induſtry of men *. Now

1. This is an argument of God's benevolence to *men*: which appears by his making ſo plentiful a proviſion for their convenience and happineſs.

* Accedit etiam ad nonnullorum animantium ——conſervationem et ſalutem hominum etiam ſollertia et diligentia. Nam multæ——pecudes ſunt, quæ ſine procuratione hominum ſalvæ eſſe non poſſunt. Cic. de Nat. Deor. lib. 11. c. 52.

In C. 63. of the ſame book, Balbus proves, on the other hand, Ipſas beſtias hominum gratiâ generatas eſſe. He inſtances in ſheep, dogs, oxen, ſwine, &c.

2. It

2. It is alſo a proof of his benevolence to *inferior* creatures. For inanimate and vegetable ſubſtances might have anſwered *our* uſes juſt as well. The addition therefore of life and ſenſe ſhews, it was God's intention to give room for *more* happineſs in his creation; and, the care we take of brute animals being the *condition* of our deriving advantage from them, it appears to have been farther intended that ſuch care ſhould be taken.

Obj. Some brutes are uſeleſs; others deſtructive to man; and they, on the other hand, ſuffer and die for *his* convenience. To this may be anſwered,

1ſt. That the *uſeleſſneſs* of any part of the animal creation, only ſhews the dependence not to be *univerſal*. Still theſe very animals, however uſeleſs to *us*, afford arguments of divine benevolence: for they are all of them made capable, in ſome degree, of enjoying pleaſure.

2dly. The brutes, which are *deſtructive* to men, afford no argument of malevolence.--- For it was not the intention of nature that men

men ſhould be *immortal*; and the *manner* of their dying is a circumſtance of little moment.

3dly. To the remaining part of the objection we ſay; Thoſe brutes, which are uſeful to man, derive in general *more* good than ill from their connexion with him. If the lives of ſome of them are ſhortened by it, they have, while they live, care taken of them, and a better proviſion is made for them in all reſpects, than they were capable of making for themſelves. Add to this, that a much greater *number* of theſe animals is ſupported by human induſtry, than could poſſibly have ſubſiſted, if the earth had remained without cultivation.

It is true, indeed, that men ſometimes *abuſe* the power they have over animals. But what power will they not abuſe?

V. *Of the mutual dependence of mankind.*

This conſtitution affords a ſtrong preſumption of divine benevolence.

1. Becauſe it gives room for the exerciſe of human *virtue*.

2. Becauſe

2. Becauſe it gives riſe to the pleaſures of *friendſhip*, and to thoſe which we derive from the *eſteem* and *benevolence* of other men.

3. Becauſe it unites men in *ſociety*; and ſo leads them on to every enjoyment they receive from their mutual intercourſe.

Still indeed we lie open to the objection ſo often repeated, and ſo applicable to almoſt every circumſtance of our condition in this world, viz.

Obj. Men are continually *abuſing* their power over others; and thus numbers ſuffer by one man's fault.

The objection however may be anſwered in many different ways.

1ſt. The *faults* of men were not *intended* by their Creator. All inſtances of miſconduct in them are contrary to *his* will; and *almoſt* all are contrary to their own intereſt, which naturally all men purſue.

2dly. All our faults ariſe either from the conſtitution of the human *mind*, or the *external* circumſtances of our ſituation; both which have been already vindicated.

3dly. The good effects of ſocial intercourſe far overbalance the ill; and therefore theſe

can

can only weaken, not deſtroy, the force of the argument.

Hitherto we have ſought for arguments in the different *parts* of the conſtitution of nature, and the *particular laws* to which each of them is ſubject. The next object of enquiry will be thoſe *more general* laws, which extend thro' God's *whole* adminiſtration: and theſe alſo will be found to ſuggeſt probable arguments of a benevolent intention in the Author of Nature; certainly to afford *no* preſumption of a *contrary* intention.

END OF THE FIRST PART.

PART

PART II.

THIS part of our inquiry, agreeably to the plan propoſed, will comprehend an anſwer to the following queſtions.

1. Whether the more general laws of divine adminiſtration afford any preſumption of good, or ill, intention in the Deity.

2. Whether any additional evidence ariſes, on either part, from the uniformity and conſtancy with which God's laws are adminiſtered.

3. Whether the continual oppoſition made to divine adminiſtration by human agents, afford us any cauſe to doubt of the benevolence of our Maker.

I. *Of the more general laws of divine adminiſtration.*

The principal of theſe laws are three; all of which, at firſt ſight, may create ſome ſuſpicion

picion at leaſt of a want of benevolence in the Author of Nature.

1. That the happineſs of men is made to depend on their *actions*.

2. That they are excited to perform theſe actions by *puniſhments*, as well as rewards.

3. That, in *both* ways, they are often excited to *hurtful*, as well as beneficial, actions.

1. That the happineſs of men is made to depend on their actions.

This law, whatever other conclusions may be drawn from it, will certainly afford no proof of *malevolence*. It is true, indeed, that men's happineſs or miſery is, to a great degree, put in their own power. But power, of itſelf, has no more tendency to ill than good; and therefore no inference, of either kind, can with certainty be gathered from this part of the conſtitution of nature. The preſumption however ſeems rather to lie on the ſide of benevolence. To give the *ability* of obtaining good, is, in effect, to give the *good itſelf*. Our *imagination* at leaſt, if not our *underſtanding*, readily aſſents to this concluſion: and, if we look no farther than ſenſible objects, *ex-*

perience alſo will juſtify us in aſſerting, that in the ordinary courſe of things, he who *can* be happy, *will* be ſo.

But, if this rule of God's government be no proof of his malevolence, it may ſeem at leaſt to prove, that he is *not* benevolent. For had happineſs been the end propoſed by our Creator, we are ready to think, he would have provided ſome *certain means* to make us happy. Human actions are *uncertain.* Therefore happineſs was *not* the end propoſed.

This is plauſible; yet, when examined to the bottom, will be found to have no real weight. For

1ſt. The argument proves *too much.* It leads to a total rejection of all final cauſes. Even the ſucceſſive exiſtence of plants and animals muſt no longer be imputed to deſign. For we ſee, in many particular inſtances, that the means provided fail of ſucceſs.

2dly. The uncertainty complained of could no way have been prevented, without making it *impoſſible* for us to attain to any conſiderable degree of happineſs. Were the advantages we enjoy in the preſent ſtate of things independent on our actions, no man would act:

and, if you deſtroy all the *active* pleaſures of our nature, you deſtroy by far the moſt valuable part of our enjoyments; all, indeed, that makes the condition of a man better than that of a brute. I might have ſaid, *more* than all. For even brutes, as it ſeems, have ſome pleaſure from acting.—More particularly,

That a man's happineſs ſhould depend on his *own* actions, was plainly neceſſary, in order to provoke the exertion of his mental faculties; to make him *reaſon*, *judge*, *chuſe*: which very acts conſtitute much of his happineſs; improve the pleaſures ariſing from other ſources; and fill up thoſe vacancies of ſenſual gratification, which would otherwiſe be attended with diſguſt and uneaſineſs.

That the happineſs of *one* man ſhould depend on the actions of *another*, was neceſſary, in order to give us the pleaſures of *benevolent* actions and paſſions; of *ſelf-approbation*; of *fame*: all of them principal ingredients in human happineſs.

I know not what more can be urged, on the oppoſite ſide, unleſs it ſhould be ſuppoſed,

that another, and a different, ſyſtem, might have been formed; in which ſenſible beings ſhould have been no more than *paſſive* inſtruments; capable of *receiving* pleaſures, not of *procuring* them; pleaſures to us unknown, and inconceivable *.

But this ſuppoſition is only a dream. The poſſibility of ſuch a ſyſtem, as is here deſcribed, cannot be ſupported, even by the ſlighteſt proof. We can only reaſon from what we *know*; not ſurely from what we *fancy*. We *know*, that action is a continual ſource of happineſs: but we do *not* know, that happineſs *might*

* Such was the Epicurean paradiſe. Quod beatum eternumque ſit, nec habere ipſum *negoti* quicquam, nec exhibere alteri.—In anſwer therefore to the inquiry, quæ vita Deorum ſit? Velleius ſays (Cic. de Nat. Deorum, lib. 1, c. 19.) Ea videlicet quâ nihil beatius, nihil omnibus bonis affluentius cogitari poteſt. *Nihil enim agit*; nullis occupationibus eſt implicatus; nulla *opera* molitur.——In like manner *human* happineſs is placed in animi ſecuritate, et in *omnium vacatione munerum*, c. 20.

On all which Cotta remarks, c. 37. Profectò Epicurus, quaſi pueri delicati, nihil *ceſſatione* melius exiſtimat. At ipſi tamen pueri, etiam cum ceſſent, exercitatione aliquâ ludicrâ delectantur.

So again Plutarch, ὁ μὲν ἔν ἐπῶν, ὅτι δεῖ τὸν εὐθυμεῖν μέλλοντα μήτε πολλὰ πρήσσειν μήτε ἰδίᾳ μήτε ξυνῇ, πρῶτον μὲν ἡμῖν πολυλεκτὴν τὴν εὐθυμίαν καθίστησι, γινομένην ὄψιον ἀπραξίας.—ἔπειτα καὶ ψευδὴς ἐστὶ τὸ εὐθυμεῖν τὸς μὴ πολλὰ πράσσοντας. Περὶ εὐθυμίας.

See

might have been attained *without* it. Imagination only, not reason, suggested the idea.

2. That men are excited to act by *punishments*, as well as rewards.

This again is no proof of *malevolence*. For there is room to suppose, and some reason to believe, that *rewards alone* would be ineffectual. In *human* governments we know and feel that they are. Now *that* evil can be no argument of a *bad* intention, which appears to be necessary for accomplishing a *good* one.—But the necessity of penal sanctions will best appear, if we attend to a particular instance.

It is certain, then, that *rewards only* would have been an insufficient provision for the preservation of the individual, and the continuance of the species. With respect to the *former*, we should have wanted the admonitions of hunger, thirst, and weariness, to inform us of the *times*, when nature demands supply. In *both* cases, if the appetites were removed,

See the same writer in his piece Non posse suav. viv. sec. Epicurum. Λείπεται δὲ τὸ πρακτικὸν ὅσας ἡδονὰς ἔχει διαλθεῖν. Αὐτοὶ δὲ δὴ πρὸ λέγουσιν, ὡς τὸ εὖ ΠΟΙΕΙΝ ἥδιόν ἐστι τοῦ ΠΑΣΧΕΙΝ, and what follows. And again, ταῖς μείζοσι τῆς ψυχῆς χαραῖς—μείζεθος ὑποκεῖθαι δεῖ πρόξεως, &c.

men might forbear to uſe the *means* of preſervation, &c. notwithſtanding the pleaſure annexed. For the purſuit of pleaſure in one kind is often prevented by the deſire of *different* pleaſures. In *both* caſes too the appetites ſeem neceſſary to engage us in the *labour* and *hazards*, which either procure, or follow, the gratification. To make this ſtill more plain, let us ſuppoſe the pleaſure of food to be what it is, and all other circumſtances to continue; but let the uneaſy ſenſations of hunger be entirely removed: could theſe ſenſations be ſpared without inconvenience? Certainly not. For, 1ſt, as has been ſaid, they inform us of the *times*, when nature wants a ſupply. 2dly, they prevent us from *overlooking*, or *forgetting* our ſuſtenance, which we might eaſily do, when engaged in other purſuits. 3dly, they are requiſite to overcome our *indolence*; which otherwiſe would often prevent the labour neceſſary for acquiring ſuſtenance.

Should it be propoſed to obtain the ſame ends by increaſing the pleaſures of gratification, you will increaſe alſo the temptation to exceſs. If you would have the pleaſure ſtop at the very *point*, where gratification becomes hurtful;

hurtful; you require ſuch a conſtitution of body, as you have no reaſon to ſuppoſe within the bounds of poſſibility. Or, admitting it to be poſſible, who can ſay that it might not be productive of greater loſs or harm? The preſent conſtitution *may* be neceſſary (and *here*, it muſt be obſerved, we contend for nothing more) to our perfection and happineſs.——Now ſuch creatures as *we* are *could* not be preſerved without the appetite of *hunger*: and as for *other* kind of creatures, we are ſurely not judges of the different ways in which it was *poſſible* for the Deity to form and preſerve animal bodies.

The ſame method of reaſoning, or nearly the ſame, may eaſily be applied to all other uneaſy ſenſations, by which we are led to fulfil the ends of nature.—But the reader need not be told, that it is not pretended to give a *full* ſolution of this difficulty. *Why* God chuſes to govern by *penal* ſanctions, we know but imperfectly: yet we know enough to diſcern that theſe ſanctions will furniſh no proof againſt divine benevolence. We ſee plainly, that, as the *preſent* ſyſtem is formed, they are neceſſary to the moſt beneficial and important

purpoſes;

purpoſes: and therefore they afford no degree of evidence againſt a kind and benevolent intention (already ſupported by ſo many clear and ſtrong preſumptions) in the Author of Nature.

3. That men are excited to *hurtful*, as well as uſeful, actions.

This circumſtance again may appear, on a ſlight view, unfavourable to the doctrine of divine benevolence. For it is this part of our conſtitution, which evidently gives occaſion to all the *vice*, and moſt of the miſery, that is in the world.—Yet neither here is the concluſion juſtly founded *.

For the *general* principles, by which men are excited to action *are* what they *ought* to be. Let them but continue general; and you cannot ſo much as *imagine* a change for the better. The difficulty then will fall under ano-

* Plutarch (againſt the Stoics) ſeems to have miſapprehended this matter. He inſiſts that *vice* is *not beneficial*. We allow it. But we maintain that it *ſprings* from beneficial *principles*; principles *tending* to good, tho', in ſome particulsr inſtances, giving *occaſion* to evil.

ther head, viz. the *conſtancy* of the laws by which the world is governed.—Or, if any doubt ſhould ſtill remain, the ſubject will be reſumed, when we come to ſpeak of the *oppoſition* made by human beings to the counſels of their Maker.

II.

Of the uniformity of the divine adminiſtration.

It is an undiſputed fact, that the world is governed, to a very great degree, by *invariable* laws: and this rigour of divine adminiſtration has been thought an argument againſt divine benevolence.—The courſe of nature, it is ſaid, never changes. Had this courſe been intended for our benefit, the laws of it would have been *ſuſpended* in every inſtance, where they obſtruct, or defeat, the end propoſed. In fact they are *not* ſuſpended. Our benefit therefore was *not intended*. At leaſt, the harm ariſing from the preſent conſtitution of things, in *ſome* inſtances, is as much a proof of *malevolence*, as the good produced in *other* inſtances of benevolence.

Before an anſwer be given to this allegation, I muſt aſk, Whether the ſuſpenſion required, of the laws of nature, be an *apparent*, or an *inviſible* ſuſpenſion. Surely not an apparent ſuſpenſion, the *preſent* method purſued by Povidence being evidently more advantageous to mankind. Without the *appearance* of uniformity there could be no room for human *ſkill*, and no motive to human *action*. Not the former: becauſe ſkill of every kind is founded on conſtant experience. Not the latter: becauſe no man would ever be induced to act, if he were equally ſure, *without* acting, of ſucceſs in every undertaking; and he could not *but* be ſure, if he ſaw, that the courſe of nature was continually accommodated to *his* wants and deſires.

But, as this is a ſubject of ſome importance, it may be proper to conſider it a little more particularly.—I ſay, then, that the happineſs of man depends on the exerciſe of his faculties: that is, on the right application of his active powers, under the direction of his underſtanding. But the underſtanding can give *no* direction for our conduct, unleſs we can judge of the effects and conſequences of actions

actions propoſed to our deliberation: and we only judge of theſe (we have no other *poſſible* method of judging) from the effects of *like* actions in times paſt. If then ſimilar effects do not conſtantly flow from ſimilar cauſes, we ſhall have *no* rule of conduct at all.—Experience of the paſt is our only guide for the future. We have no other way of knowing that food will nouriſh, or that arſenic will poiſon us. We have no other way of diſcerning any connection between the ſeed we put into the ground, and the harveſt we expect to reap. It is thus we learn, that labour muſt prepare the ſoil; that ſun and rain will cheriſh the riſing plant, and bring it at length to maturity and perfection. Were not like cauſes to produce like effects, we could form no judgment at all of future events; and therefore our underſtanding could never regulate our conduct.

Some perhaps may imagine that all the advantages propoſed *might* be obtained without *perfect* uniformity. The objectors, it ſeems, only demand, that the courſe of nature ſhould be ſuſpended *occaſionally*, when men would loſe, or ſuffer, from its continuance;

ance; and in all other caſes ſhould remain invariable. Now here, it may be thought, would be a *general* experience, affording ſufficient probability to direct our conduct. Yet, while we enjoyed all the benefit of the preſent conſtitution of things, we ſhould ſuffer none of the harm.

It would not perhaps be eaſy for men to agree on the particular caſes in which the laws of nature ought to be ſuſpended; or for Providence to accommodate them all at once ſuitably to their various wants and wiſhes.—But, not to inſiſt on this, I anſwer, that, on the ſuppoſition here made, we ſhould learn from experience, that the good ſucceſs of all our *deſigns* was infallible. For either they would ſucceed in the *ordinary* courſe of things, or the courſe of things would be *altered*, to prevent our diſappointment. We ſhould therefore ſoon find, that *ſkill* and *prudence* were perfectly inſignificant, and conſequently the very exiſtence of deſign and contrivance would become in the end *impoſſible*. In like manner, we ſhould learn from experience, that the objects of our averſion were *conſtantly* removed, and our deſires *conſtantly* gratified, either with,

or

or without, the concurrence of our own *endeavours*; in the one caſe, by the ordinary courſe of things, in the other, by a ſeaſonable deviation from it. We ſhould therefore ſoon diſcover, that human action and induſtry were altogether *inſignificant*; and conſequently ſhould have no motive for acting at all.

Even a *ſecret* ſuſpenſion of natural laws would be attended with the ſame inconvenience, if men once found themſelves *ſecure* (no matter by what means) from want, diſappointment, and pain of every kind. For they would juſt as much, and as confidently, depend on this unſeen interpoſition, as in the former caſe on a viſible and extraordinary Providence; and, in either of theſe caſes, they would want the chief enjoyments of human life; all that ariſe from the exertion of their beſt faculties in promoting and ſecuring their mutual happineſs.

Shall we ſtill be told, that God might *occaſionally* deviate in an *unſeen* manner from the general laws of his adminiſtration? that he might do this, to a conſiderable degree; yet not ſo, as to encourage men in *truſting* to theſe extraordinary intetpoſitions? and that therefore

fore human ſkill and induſtry might ſtill continue, and only be employed with greater ſucceſs?

I anſwer—

1ſt. That, in *proportion* as men owed their ſucceſs to ſuch ſecret cauſes, their ſkill and their induſtry would become *leſs* important. Therefore they would be *leſs encouraged* to ſtudy and purſue the improvement of their happineſs: and, in ſome degree, therefore the ſame inconveniencs would ſtill remain. But

2dly. So far as theſe ſecret interpoſitions are truly proper for us, I ſee no reaſon to deny, that God *actually interpoſes*. For, ſince, by the very ſuppoſition, the deviations, to be made from the ordinary courſe of nature, are always to remain *undiſcovered*; it can never be concluded, that God does *not* deviate, only becauſe no diſcovery is made.—It is in this ſenſe, that *reaſon* allows us to hope, and *revelation* authoriſes us to expect, a *particular providence*. It is in this ſenſe, that we may reaſonably promiſe ourſelves ſucceſs in our *petitions* to Heaven, without looking for miracles: and without that arbitrary aſſumption, which has been advanced by ſome very elegant writers

writers*, viz. that the original laws of the univerſe were artificially accommodated to all the future occaſions and wants of every devout petitioner. It is in this ſenſe alſo, that we are promiſed the aſſiſtance of God's *Holy Spirit*: the *effects* of which may appear in a life of piety and virtue; but the *operations* are ſecret, not to be diſtinguiſhed from the workings of our own minds.

To return from this digreſſion, I ſuppoſe it has ſufficiently appeared, that the uniformity, with which God governs the world, is abſolutely *neceſſary* in a diſpenſation of things, adapted to the uſes of an intelligent and active being

III. *Of the oppoſition made by human agents to the ends of divine government.*

It has often been alledged, that the natural ſyſtem, however well and wiſely framed, is liable to be perverted by the folly and wickedneſs of *man*; ſo that the cauſes, which *might* have produced good, are made *in fact*

* See Woolaſton, Sect. 5.

the means and instruments of evil *. Now the *intention* of God, we are told, is not to be collected from the *possible* effects of natural causes, but from the effects they are *likely* to produce under human direction: and since men have both a *power* of doing harm, and innumerable *temptations* to do it, those effects must frequently be *evil*. Evil then, as well as good, was *intended* by our Maker.

Here again, as in the last instance, the *fact* is not to be contested. Unfortunately for the race of mankind, it is confirmed to us by daily and hourly experience.——But many things remain to be well considered, before the conclusion drawn from this fact can either be justified or excused.

1st, Let it be observed, that the natural system may be *improved*, as well as perverted, by the conduct of mankind. If its good effects are liable to be obstructed by the weakness and wickedness of human agents, they are capable also of being continued and increased by human skill and virtue: and this advantage should undoubtedly be put in the

* Τό γε πολλαχῆ εἶναι ἐργώδη καὶ δύσκολον τὸν βίον, ἄγαν ἀληθές. Καὶ γὰρ εἰ φύσει τοιοῦτον ἔχει τὸν τρόπον, ὑπό γε ΗΜΩΝ εἰς τοῦτο ἀφύλακτοι διαφθορᾶς. Plut. Conf. ad Apoll.

balance

balance againſt ſuch occaſional perverſions. Probably it may be found ſufficient to outweigh the miſchief complained of. For men are more likely to uſe their endeavours for improving and bettering their condition, than to draw unneceſſary evils from a ſyſtem naturally beneficial. The moſt that can be alledged is, that the preſent ſyſtem has a *mixed* tendency; and, if the good preponderate (the *contrary* of which does not appear), ſuch a tendency is ſurely no proof of malevolence. But this is not all. For

2dly, Both our *power* of doing ill, and our *temptations* to do it, are the reſult of a wiſe and good conſtitution of nature.

1. The *power* is derived from certain general laws of evident good tendency; namely, that each man's happineſs is made to depend on his actions; and that, in very many inſtances, the happineſs of one man is made to depend on the actions of another. Theſe laws have been already vindicated; and appear to be inſeparably connected with the buſineſs and the pleaſures of human life. A world, in which nothing depended on ourſelves, however it might have ſuited ſome imaginary race of beings, would never have ſuited *man-*

kind; or, rather, would have transformed them into other creatures; from intelligent and active beings to beings immerſed in ſenſe, and incapable of all higher gratifications.

2. Nor has the other part of the objection been altogether neglected. We all know, by fatal experience, that we have not only the power of doing ill, but are alſo *tempted* to do it. Yet we have ſeen, that no inference can be drawn from this confeſſion to the prejudice of divine benevolence; for that the *general* principles of the human mind, notwithſtanding accidental variations, are what they ought to be. In ſingle perſons, it muſt be owned, the balance of the paſſions is very frequently deſtroyed; ſeldom indeed preſerved with exactneſs and truth. But then the defects, to be found in one man, are ſupplied by the exceſſes in another. So that, if you conſider the *whole* ſpecies, you will neither find too much, nor too little, of any one principle in the human mind. Indolence and ambition, avarice and ſenſuality, reſentment and compaſſion, if not in the ſame perſons, yet in different perſons, counteract and balance each other. Nor is there a ſingle ſentiment

timent implanted in our nature, which can either be increaſed, or leſſened, in the *whole* race of mankind, without loſs or harm to the human ſpecies; unleſs indeed you aſſume a liberty of altering *many* things at a time; of forming a new and fantaſtic ſyſtem, perhaps made up of inconſiſtent parts, and beyond the bounds of poſſibility itſelf. So true is that celebrated paſſage of Cicero, de Nat. Deorum, lib. 2. c. 34. *Siquis corrigere aliquid volet, aut deterius faciet, aut id, quod fieri non potuit, deſiderabit.*

Theſe conſiderations will receive additional force, if there be any ground for what was intimated in the former part of this treatiſe, that the views of Providence extend beyond the limits of this preſent life. Many things here carry the *appearance* at leaſt of a ſtate of *trial* and *diſcipline*; a ſtate not to be conceived without opportunities of doing ill, and temptations to do it. Allow only the preſent life to be connected with a better, and every objection to divine benevolence ceaſes of courſe. Is it not then more reaſonable to admit and maintain this connection, than to oppoſe our viſionary difficulties (founded, for

the moſt part, on the narrowneſs of our views, and the obſcurity of our conceptions) to thoſe innumerable marks of wiſdom and goodneſs, which ſhine forth through the whole creation?

But whether we believe, or diſbelieve, a life *to come* (a ſubject on which *revelation* only is capable of giving us *full* ſatisfaction), one thing is certain, viz. that the *preſent* life furniſhes no reaſonable pretence, nor any colourable excuſe, for diſputing the goodneſs of our Maker. The *words* of *Cicero*, on this ſubject, are ſurely more reaſonable than his *practice*: Mala—et impia conſuetudo eſt *contra Deos* diſputandi, ſive ex animo id fit, ſive ſimulatè. De Nat. Deorum, lib. 2. c. 27.

END OF THE SECOND PART.

PART

PART III.

IT has already appeared, that the preſent conſtitution of things affords *many* ſtrong preſumptions of a benevolent intention in the Author of Nature; and that *nothing* is to be found, which will juſtify a *contrary* concluſion, even in the moſt doubtful and difficult parts of divine adminiſtration. It muſt be owned, however, that the evidence produced would be either ſubverted or ſhaken, if full proof could be brought, that, in the *reſult* of things, theſe *ſeemingly* kind intentions have been all fruſtrated; and that a large overbalance of evil has actually taken place. In *human* works, it is true, the *deſign* cannot always be inferred from the *effect*. For *men* may be deceived and diſappointed. But in

divine works ſuch miſtakes are impoſſible *. *Particular* evils may ariſe in a ſyſtem whoſe general tendency is good; as we have ſeen in various inſtances. But a *prepollency* of evil can be *no* accident. If the *whole world* appear to be little more than a ſcene of wretchedneſs and miſery, we ſhall naturally ſuſpect, that nothing better was *intended*. On this ſuppoſition, we might be led to doubt, with great appearance of reaſon, whether it were conſiſtent with the wiſdom of God, not to *foreſee* the evil; or with his goodneſs, not to *prevent* it. What Cotta ſays of *reaſon* [Cic. de Nat. Deorum, lib. 3. c. 27.] might then be applied to *life itſelf*, and all the flattering hopes that ſurround it: Satius fuerit omnino non datam, quam tantâ cum pernicie datam.

But the fact here ſuppoſed has never *yet* been proved.—We believe and truſt, that it never *will*. Inſtead of coming to this gloomy

* Ubi igitur locus fuit errori Deorum? Nam patrimonia ſpe bene tradendi relinquimus; quâ poſſumus falli. Deus falli qui potuit?—Cotta in Cic. de Nat. Deorum, lib. 3. c. 31.

Plutarch (de rep. Stoic.) juſtly repreſents Chryſippus as inconſiſtent with himſelf, when he affirms that the gods ὡς ἔνι βέλτιστα προνοεῖν, yet that men, ὡς ἔνι χείριστα προάγειν.

and

and uncomfortable concluſion *, we may more reaſonably infer from the apparent *intentions* of nature, that the *ſucceſs* has been anſwerable: and that good, *prepollent* good, is the reſult of all.—Were it poſſibe for us to ſupport this inference by clear and full *experience*, we might form a *deciſive* argument for the divine benevolence.—The happineſs, we would ſay, which has in fact been produced by the preſent ſyſtem, is much greater than the miſery. This happineſs has ariſen from the *nature* of the ſyſtem itſelf; not from foreign, or accidental, cauſes. It was therefore *intended* by the Author of the ſyſtem; or the ſyſtem was formed with a *deſign* of producing happineſs. It appears then that the happineſs of created beings is an object *pleaſing* in the eyes of their Creator: or, in other words, that he is a *benevolent* Being.

All thatneeds to be inforced, in this argument, is the fact ſuppoſed as its foundation:

* ἀρά γε δικὴς ἑτέρας οἴεσθε δεῖσθαι τῆς ἀναιρεθείσης τὴν παρόησιαν, καὶ θαῤῥεῖν ἔχειν, ἐκκόπτοντας ἑαυτῶν ἡδονὴν καὶ χαρὰν τοσαύτην; Plut. Non poſſe ſuav. vivi ſec. Epicurum.

And again, τῆς μὲν εὐτυχίας τὸ ἥδιστον κωλύουσιν, ταῖς δὲ δυσκολίαις ἀποχρῶν ἐκ ἀπολείπουσιν—with much more to the ſame purpoſe. The whole of it is perhaps one of the fineſt paſſages in Plutarch's writings.

viz.

viz. that happineſs is *actually* prepollent in this ſyſtem. This, as has been already obſerved, is a ſubject of difficult inveſtigation. We can only *judge* of thoſe parts which are known to us, and *conjecture* of thoſe which are unknown.

1. Then let each man conſider *himſelf.*—Does he not think life a benefit? Would he not think the loſs of it a misfortune? Are not his pleaſures more frequent, tho' leſs attended to, than his pains? Are not the deep impreſſions, made by theſe, to be imputed more to the rarity, than the degree, of them? Does he not paſs a conſiderable part of *every* day in a manner which gives him *ſome* pleaſure? Are not *thoſe* days comparatively *few,* in which he has found any conſiderable degree of *bodily* pain? Is not his uneaſineſs of *mind* leſs frequent and permanent, than his chearfulneſs and ſatisfaction?

To theſe queſtions, no doubt, different anſwers will be given by different men. But he who anſwers them all in the affirmative, has at leaſt *one* good argument, and in which he cannot well be deceived, for admitting the doctrine of *prepollent good.*

2. Let

2. Let each man conjecture, as well as he can, concerning the happineſs of his *friends* and *acquaintance*, and of all thoſe who come under his *immediate* notice.—Poſſibly he will find many of them furniſhed with various means of pleaſure; few of them ſubject to great misfortunes: many more healthy than ſick; many more, competently provided with the conveniences of life, than ſtruggling with want and difficulties; many more, poſſeſſed of friends and relations, whom they love and who love them, than oppreſſed and perſecuted by enemies; many more, happy in the hope of future good, than alarmed by the fear of impending evil.—He who finds this to be a true repreſentation, will be ſtill more ſtrongly inclined to admit the *prepollency* of good in our preſent ſyſtem.

It muſt not be thought an objection to this concluſion, that many more are *poor*, than *rich*. For we only give the name of *rich* to thoſe who are *peculiarly* ſo: as of * beautiful, wiſe, ſtrong, tall, to thoſe who are *above* the

* So Balbus in Cic. de Nat. Deorum, lib. 2. c. 28. Motus enim quiſque *formoſus* eſt? Athenis cum eſſem, è gregibus Epheborum vix ſinguli reperiebantur.

common

common rate. It will be enough to ſatisfy an impartial inquirer, if he finds many more in *plenty*, than in *want*: i. e. able to provide what their ſtation in life requires, and *not unhappy* from the deſire of a higher ſtation *.

3. Let each man examine the moſt authentic accounts of *diſtant* times and places. Poſſibly he will ſee cauſe to conjecture, that the perſons *unknown* to him have not, in general, been leſs happy, than thoſe he knows. If, in other ages and nations, the circumſtances of mankind appear not ſo favourable as in ours; it is probable, however, that the wants and the tempers of men are every where *accommodated* to their circumſtances, at leaſt in a conſiderable degree; and that others may even be *happy* in thoſe ſituations, in which *we* ſhould think ourſelves exquiſitely miſerable †.

Thus

* Seneca goes farther (Conſ. ad Helv. c. 12.) Aſpice, quanto major ſit pars pauperum, quos nihilo notabis triſtiores, ſolliciioreſque divitibus: imo neſcio an eo *lætiores* ſint, quo animus eorum in pauciora diſtringitur.

† Nullum invenies exilium, in quo non aliquis *animi cauſâ* moretur. Sen. ad Helvid. c. 6.

And

Thus the inhabitants of ſome parts of *Africa* might appear to *us* to be in the loweſt and moſt wretched ſtate; as wanting almoſt every advantage of ſocial life. No *arts, learning, laws*: and, of courſe, a very precarious enjoyment of their lives and poſſeſſions. Yet it has been found, that theſe very men, when removed to England, have regretted the loſs of their own country, and expreſſed the utmoſt impatience to return to it. Which could not poſſibly have been the caſe, if they had not, on the *whole*, been *pleaſed* with their former ſituation.

If this appears to be a *juſt* view of the ſtate of mankind, it muſt be owned, that the preſent ſyſtem of things produces *prepollent* good. If it be controverted, the objections will probably fall under one or other of the following heads *.

And again—

Nihil miſerum eſt, quod in naturam conſuetudo perduxit. Paullatim enim voluptati ſunt, quæ neceſſitate cœperunt. Nulla illis domicilia (he ſpeaks of the Germans) nullæ ſedes ſunt; niſi quas laſſitudo in diem poſuit; vilis, et hîc quærendus manu, victus; horrenda iniquitas cœli; intecta corpora: hoc quod tibi calamitas videtur, tot gentium vita eſt. Sen. de Prov. c. 4.

* Theſe objections are taken from a beautiful declamation of *Wollaſton's*, in the 9th ſect. of his Religion of Nature delineated.

1. That,

1. That, even in *peaceful* and ſettled times the pains of life exceed the pleaſures.—Or, if this be given up,

2. That the calamities of *war* are fatal to the repoſe and happineſs of the world; and that theſe calamities are ſo frequent, as to involve a very conſiderable part of the human ſpecies. Or

3. That many innocent perſons are rendered unhappy by *tyranny* and *perſecution*.—To which may be added,

4. That the *evils* of human life conſtitute the chief objects of *hiſtory*; and that this clearly ſhews the preſent world to be a ſtate of miſery, not of happineſs.

I.

It is alledged, that, even in peaceful and ſettled times, the pains men ſuffer exceed their pleaſures. For that

1. They who are moſt ſucceſsful, have many cares and troubles, little ſincere pleaſure: and

2. Numbers of men are altogether unſucceſsful.

1. They who are ſucceſsful in life have many cares and troubles, which are very ſenſibly felt: and they have little ſincere pleaſure to balance theſe feelings.—*Childhood*, we are told, ſuffers much uneaſineſs from the reſtraint and diſcipline, to which it is ſubject; and receives no pleaſures in return, but ſuch as are trifling and vain.—*Manhood* is expoſed to inconveniences in the tranſaction of *buſineſs*, from the negligence, perverſeneſs, or knavery, of thoſe with whom we deal; to *domeſtic* diſquiets, from the faults of our wives, or children, or ſervants; and to frequent vexation, from the unkindneſs, or miſbehaviour, even of our common acquaintance and neighbours. Its enjoyments, on the other hand, are deceitful; mixed with uneaſineſs; difficult alſo to be attained, as uſually requiring the concurrence of a variety of circumſtances; and, laſtly, of ſhort duration, ſoon loſt and forgotten, as if they had never been.—*Old age* is ſubject to ſtill greater difficulties, and has leſs ability to ſtruggle with them. The loſs of our friends and relations, the pains and ſickneſs we muſt uſually expect

in

in that period of life, are ſurely very tryin circumſtances.

To all this may be added a general re mark, which is thought a full confirmation of the deſcription here given; viz. that the moſt *fortunate* of men would not wiſh a *repetition* of their paſt lives.

In anſwer to this objection, it may be ſaid more truly, that the *ſufferings* of childhood are trifling, the pleaſures great.—We only eſteem them inſignificant, becauſe they are not ſuited to the taſte of mature age. It is enough, that they ſuit the cap[illegible] elination of thoſe who enjoy the[illegible] are far from being balanced, na[illegible] commended and improved, by [illegible] of reſtraint. In this period of our lives, as in every other, our time is divided between amuſement and buſineſs: the conſtant returns of which makes both more agreeable. In ſhort, the happineſs of children is apparent, to whatever cauſe we may impute it, from their perpetual chearfulneſs and fulneſs of ſpirits.

The common cares of *manhood* hold no proportion with its ſatisfactions. It may ſafely

safely be affirmed, that, in all ordinary cases, the pleasure arising from our *domestic* affections far exceeds the anxiety which attends them: and, in many instances too, the anxiety itself is mixed with pleasure. Misbehaviour in the persons, with whom we have an intercourse of *business*, occasions indeed inconvenience and disappointment. But these things give little disturbance to a man who is *accustomed* to expect them; and often occasion *pleasure*, by giving room for our skill and prudence, in guarding against them. For, without opposition, there could be no victory. As for *quarrels* with our acquaintance and neighbours; they cannot be a very considerable mischief. For no man, I suppose, to avoid this evil, would wish to pass his days in solitude. On the other hand, the *enjoyments* of this state are various: some of them permanent; others transient indeed, but anticipated by hope, or delightful even on reflection.—If the objects of our wishes are found not answerable to our expectations, this destroys not our happiness. For *new* wishes are formed; and new pleasures received from every step we take towards their gratification.

If the enjoyments themſelves are not what they ſeem; yet the very *hope* of obtaining them is a conſtant ſource of happineſs.

For the comforts and pleaſures of *old age*, ſee *Cicero de Senectute*, where the ſubject is indeed exhauſted.

The fallacy of the *general* remark is very obvious. Whatever pleaſures we may have enjoyed in our paſt lives, we expect *no* pleaſure from the repetition. Novelty and variety either are, or ſeem to be, *eſſential* to our happineſs: and hence it comes to paſs, that the frequent returns of the *ſame* enjoyments appear, in imagination, flat and inſipid. But no concluſion can be drawn from this appearance; which in truth is nothing more than an illuſion of the fancy. Add to this, that the ills of life are perhaps better *remembered* than the goods. The former affect us more forcibly, becauſe they are leſs frequent: the latter, being familiar and common, make no deep impreſſion on the mind. On *both* accounts we deceive ourſelves in the judgments we form of our paſt lives.

Thus far, however, we have only ſeen the condition of mankind in its faireſt light: we have

have only attended to that part of our ſpecies who are *ſucceſsful* in the world. But

2. Numbers of men are altogether *unſucceſsful*. They never obtain a comfortable ſettlement, or they are afterwards deprived of it. They are unhappy in the miſbehaviour of their families and friends, or in the loſs of them. Their wiſeſt ſchemes are defeated by untoward accidents: and they languiſh under misfortunes, of mind, or body, or fortune, which no care or caution was capable of preventing. Theſe caſes, indeed, are ſo frequent, and ſo ſtriking, that they are become the daily ſubject of converſation: every hour almoſt preſents us with ſome new ſcene of want or miſery; and objects of diſtreſs are continually before our eyes.

To this may be anſwered, that the picture is not fairly drawn. It is heightened beyond probability and nature.

In times of peace (for of ſuch only are we ſpeaking) the far *greater* part of mankind both obtain and preſerve a competent ſhare of the neceſſaries and conveniences of life. Many of thoſe who do not, ſuffer leſs than is imagined; and many acquire by habit an

ability to bear their misfortunes. Others meet with unexpected relief and comfort; others end their cares and their lives together.

The *miſbehaviour* of families and friends, tho' a ſevere affliction to *ſome* diſpoſitions, is not ſo to *all:* with many it is not of force enough to deſtroy their chearfulneſs and happineſs. *Small* faults in thoſe we love deprive us not of the pleaſure we receive from them: *great* faults deſtroy the affection we bear them, and leave us unconcerned ſpectators of what they do or ſuffer. The affliction we feel on the *loſs* of our near relations, is a proof of the great pleaſure we once received from them; and the pleaſure was *permanent*; the grief ſoon paſſes away.

Nor is it to be wondered, that we ſee and hear ſo much of the evils of life. Among the vaſt numbers of the human ſpecies, there may be frequent accidents and calamities; yet *many more*, who eſcape, than who ſuffer them. If they were more common, they would be leſs remarked. They are frequently made ſubjects of converſation; becauſe men are curious to hear of ſingular events,

and

and take a pleaſure in indulging their compaſſion.

II.

Whatever may be ſaid of peaceful times, *war*, we are told, and the *conſequences* of war, are fatal to multitudes. Many are deprived of all the comforts of life: many more of life itſelf; not thoſe only who fall in the field, but thoſe who are expoſed, by military plunder, to nakedneſs and hunger, and periſh for want of the neceſſary means of preſervation. Nor are theſe calamities rare in the world, and extraordinary. Unhappily, they are ſo frequent, as to involve a great part of the human ſpecies.

In abatement, however, of this accumulated charge, ſeveral conſiderations may be offered.

1ſt. The *lives* loſt in war are foreign to the purpoſe. For it ought not to be conſidered as a diminution of a man's happineſs, that his life is ended by a *muſquet*, rather than a *fever*.

2dly. The *dangers* attending a ſtate of war become, from habit, ſo familiar, that

the perſons expoſed to them feel little uneaſineſs.

3dly. The *poverty*, and perhaps *ſlavery*, which follow, may indeed in *ſome* men produce great affliction; but not in the *generality*. Theſe evils are only felt by men who know what it is to be *rich* and *free*. The reſt ſuffer no great change. They always have been, and they continue to be, ſubject to *labour*; and receive, in return for it, a competent ſhare, ſometimes a plentiful ſhare, of the conveniences of life.—*Slavery* was, in ancient times, the lot of every priſoner of war; and muſt have extended therefore to great numbers of men. But the condition of ſlaves is uſually much leſs miſerable, than we are apt to imagine. They may ſuffer, no doubt, and too often do ſuffer, from the cruelty of their *maſter*. But it is his *intereſt* to uſe them well: and *moſt* men, we may ſuppoſe, underſtand their intereſt, and purſue it. Even in this land of liberty, men have ſometimes been found, who wiſhed us to follow the *example* of the ancients; and maintained

that

that the inſtitution of *domeſtic ſlavery* was beneficial to the world *.

4thly. It ſhould not be quite forgotten, that, while the condition of ſome men is rendered worſe by war, that of others is rendered *better*.

Indeed, the *whole* number, made unhappy by theſe public calamities, bears no proportion to the bulk of mankind. In nations totally reduced by conqueſt, it has ſometimes happened, that a very conſiderable part of the inhabitants have been reduced to ſervitude. But theſe inſtances are rare. Very few occur in our own times; and we may reaſonably hope, that the practice of antiquity, notwithſtanding it has met with ſome able advocates, will never again revive among civilized nations.

* It appears from innumerable inſtances, that ſlaves, among the Greeks and Romans, lived in a very different manner from *modern* ſlaves. Judge from the following paſſage of Seneca, de Prov. c. 1.——Cum videris bonos viros, acceptoſque Diis, laborare, ſudare, per arduum aſcendere, malos autem *laſcivire et voluptatibus fluere*, cogita filiorum nos modeſtiâ delectari, *vernularum licentiâ*.

III.

It is ſaid, that many innocent perſons are rendered unhappy by *tyranny* and *perſecution*. But

1ſt. The effects of *tyranny* are uſually confined to a *few* perſons; ſeldom extend, unleſs indirectly, to the *body* of a people. Even under the government of ſuch wretches as *Nero* and *Domitian*, many thouſands of men, thro' all parts of the empire, lived in plenty, and quiet, and ſecurity*. Nay, the diſtant provinces were perhaps *more* ſecure, than when expoſed to the plunder of republican governors. With regard to the few, who become objects of envy, or jealouſy, or reſentment, they muſt, of courſe, fall victims to abſolute power. But that power is more frequently exerted in *ſhortening* men's lives, than in making them *miſerable* while they live.

2dly. *Perſecution* is indeed confined to no rank of men. No age or ſex eſcapes its fury.

* See in Plut. περὶ ἀυθυμίας, a deſcription of the general happineſs men enjoyed, I know not under what prince, but certainly under a deſpotic government.—Διὰ δὲ τὰ κοινὰ, &c.

But

But then it is uſually of ſhort continuance: for either the objects of it are deſtroyed, or, by collecting themſelves into numbers, and making a vigorous reſiſtance, they are able to ſhake off the yoke which oppreſſes them. The perſecution indeed of the primitive Chriſtians, even when freed from the rubbiſh of uncertain traditions, and diveſted of every circumſtance, which folly or fraud has annexed to it, will ſtill furniſh ſomething like an exception to this remark. Yet the numbers, we know, of thoſe who ſuffered, have been greatly magnified: the intervals of quiet, which the church enjoyed, were very frequent, and ſometimes long; and very ſeldom did the miſchief prevail at once through all the parts of the Roman empire. The ſufferers, no doubt, were many of them put to death in a way more painful than the common lot of humanity. But in theſe pains they were wonderfully ſupported: perhaps by a divine ſpirit; certainly by the proſpect of a happy immortality: which was believed by them with a degree of aſſurance and confidence, that, in a manner, *counteracted* their natural feelings,

feelings, and enabled them to *rejoice* under the ſevereſt tortures.

The ſingularity of this caſe has led me out of the way. But I ſhall now return; and ſhall briefly conſider the fourth head of objection already mentioned.

IV.

The objector concludes, that this world is a place of miſery, becauſe the chief objects of *hiſtory*, in every age, have been the calamities of mankind.—But there is very little force in this objection. For

1ſt. Hiſtory deſcribes the ſtate only in public affairs; not the continuance of peaceful government, and the happy influence of it. Theſe, from their very nature, can have little room in an hiſtorical narration; tho' they may do well enough for a panegyrical declaimer. For it is clearly impoſſible, that a writer ſhould collect and deſcribe the various enjoyments of particular families, living under equal laws. They are not known to him; they ſeldom, if ever, become public. Whereas the oppreſſions of *magiſtrates*; the tumults of *ſubjects*,

ſubjects; *war*, *famine*, *peſtilence*; are open to general obſervation.

2dly. If ſuch events *could* be known, they would not be *related*. For the hiſtorian is chiefly employed about the tranſaction of *governors*, and no farther conſiders private perſons than as acting *under* them, or *againſt* them. He deſcribes, therefore, the *miſchiefs* which men ſuffer, either from the *abuſe* of power, or the *reſiſtance* made to it; from the *wars* in which they engage, or which they are obliged to *repel*; and from every inſtance of civil or of foreign *diſſenſion*. But the *good* derived from a regular adminiſtration of juſtice is paſſed over; as the ſupreme magiſtrate does not immediately appear in it.

3dly. Hiſtorians are moſt apt to enlarge on ſuch events as will be moſt *affecting* to their readers. They know the ſtrength of compaſſion; and they know, how *pleaſing* it is to the human mind. They therefore *deſignedly* expatiate on ſcenes of diſtreſs, becauſe they are ſure men will delight in the repreſentation.

4thly. If the obſervation have any force at all, it rather lies on the *contrary* ſide. For, ſince

ſince hiſtorians are chiefly employed in deſcribing the *evils* of life; it looks, as if they thought theſe more remarkable than the goods: and this again is a preſumption, that they are leſs *common*.—Juſt as, in a hiſtory of the heavens, an aſtronomer would not relate, day by day, the cuſtomary changes of *light* and *darkneſs*: but would enumerate *eclipſes* or *comets*, or any other unuſual phænomena.

But, beſide what has been ſaid, in answer to *each* of *Wollaſton's* objections, they are liable to one very obvious answer, viz. he has only attended to *one ſide* of the question. He has dwelt largely on the melancholy parts of human life; but, in a great meaſure, overlooked its enjoyments. A pen like his could, with equal eaſe and ſucceſs, have painted the *happineſs* of our preſent ſtate, and given it the appearance of a *paradiſe*.—But to form a *true* eſtimate, we muſt ſet one thing againſt another; and afterwards pronounce, if we can, on which ſide the balance turns.——In the mean time we may diſcern, on the firſt face of things, that the

Author

Author of Nature is *not malevolent* * ; and that therefore we have *nothing* to oppoſe, from *fact* and *experience*, againſt the various proofs of kind *intention*, which were alledged in the firſt part of this treatiſe. Probably, indeed, an impartial inquirer will go farther than this : and will appeal to experience for a full and final *confirmation* of the doctrine of DIVINE BENEVOLENCE.

* What might be expected from a being of *that* character, is pointed out, p. 180 of *Hutcheſon on the Paſſions*.—See alſo, in the ſame book, p. 182, a comparative view of our pleaſures and pains.

APPEN-

APPENDIX.

Containing a ſhort Theory of the Paſſions.

THIS is a ſubject, on which different writers, if they are attentive to what paſſes within their own minds, will unavoidably coincide. Such is the uniformity of our nature, that very nearly the ſame obſervations will occur to all thinking men. I ſhall not ſcruple therefore to repeat what has been ſaid by others; or even to uſe their expreſſions, when they ſuit my purpoſe.

Previous Remarks.

1. The *image* of pleaſure pleaſes: the image of pain diſpleaſes.

2. An *opinion* entertained that the pleaſure will actually be enjoyed, or the pain ſuffered, gives

gives a much *higher* pleaſure or pain, than the bare imagination of either.

On the other hand, an opinion entertained, that we ſhall *not* enjoy the pleaſure, or *not* ſuffer the pain, cauſes the agreeable image to become painful, and the diſagreeable image to become pleaſing.——In other words thus—The efficacy of any object in producing pleaſure will give us pain, when we deſpair of obtaining it: and the efficacy of any object in cauſing pain, will give us pleaſure, when we [illegible] of our ſecurity.

3. The *cuſtomary* cauſes of pleaſure and pain uſually pleaſe or diſpleaſe, when they become objects of imagination; the idea of the effect being *aſſociated* with the idea of the cauſe: and, of courſe, thoſe qualities in the object, whether animate or inanimate, on which that effect depends, become agreeable or diſagreeable in imagination.

The power we have of feeling *preſent* pleaſure or pain from reflecting on what will be, or may be, hereafter, we ſhall call *anticipation.*

4. The effects resulting from this power of anticipation are much altered by *comparison*: which

1st, Magnifies the larger, and diminishes the less, of the goods, or ills, compared;

2dly, Increases the pleasure or pain, when the *magnified* object is *expected*;

3dly, Causes us to feel pain, from the objects which naturally please, and pleasure from those which naturally displease, when the *diminished* object is expected.——In other words,

A cause of pleasure or pain, when compared with a more powerful one, will produce less effect, or none at all, or even a *contrary* effect.

5. The thoughts and feelings of *others*, as soon as they are made known or imagined, excite *similar* perceptions in us, provided no contrary cause interfere. This is called *sympathy*. But these perceptions, as well as others, are liable to be interrupted, or inverted, by the influence of *comparison*; and are often too overpowered by the superior force of those sentiments which regard *ourselves*.

It may appear perhaps, on inquiry, that all our paſſions are derived from one or more of theſe principles: viz. Imagination, opinion, aſſociation, compariſon, ſympathy. The three firſt we comprehend under the general name of anticipation.

Let us now proceed to a particular examination of each paſſion.

1ſt. We have already obſerved, that the pleaſures or pains we feel from imagination are increaſed by opinion: and we may add too, that they increaſe in proportion to the *degree* of aſſurance, with which the event is expected.—Suppoſe now two contrary events to be either imagined or apprehended, and that we know not which of them will take place; in this caſe there will evidently be a *mixture* of pleaſure and pain; and either of theſe may prevail, in any aſſignable degree, in proportion to the degrees of doubt and aſſurance.

When our expectations of good or evil are in this *uncertain* ſituation, the paſſions excited are called *deſire* and *averſion*: when *certain*, they are called *joy* and *ſorrow*.

A-

As the expectation of good or ill ſucceſs appears more or leſs *probable*, deſire and averſion take the names of *hope* and *fear*.

2dly. In each man's imagination, the *power* of enjoying pleaſure, implies the *certain* enjoyment of it. Hence the *acquiſition* of this power pleaſes; and the proſpect, or image, of ſuch acquiſition alſo pleaſes. The *power* therefore of enjoying, as well as the *actual* enjoyment, becomes an object of deſire.

From this ſource we derive the deſires of *liberty*, *dominion*, *property*. *Fame* too, as it gives ſome degree of power, muſt alſo become an object of deſire.

3dly. If by any means we ſhould come to participate the pleaſures and pains of others, *their* enjoyments alſo, and the means of obtaining them, would, in like manner, become objects of deſire.

4thly. If by any means we ſhould come to receive pain from the pleaſures of others, and pleaſure from their pains; *their* enjoyments, and the means of enjoying rhem, would become objects of averſion.

5thly. Beſides a variety of ſubordinate deſires, comprehended under theſe heads, the

general idea of happineſs, whether ſelfiſh or ſocial, conſtitutes a ſuperior object of deſire, diſtinct from each particular pleaſure, and pain, and there are alſo caſes, in which it may conſtitute a deſtinct object of affection. But the paſſions excited by general ideas are uſually more feeble than thoſe which aim at particular objects.

The paſſions hitherto deſcribed ariſe from reflecting either on the *ſenſations* themſelves, whether pleaſant or painful; or on the *events* which may produce, or give occaſion to, them. But the various objects, animate or inanimate, which are found *cauſing* pleaſure or pain, will become agreeable or diſagreeable on reflection. Hence we derive the paſſions of *eſteem* and *diſeſteem*; *benevolence* and *malevolence*; the ſenſe of *honour*, and the *moral* ſenſe.

1. *Of eſteem and diſeſteem.*

1. We eſteem *ourſelves* for actions or qualities, which either produce *immediate* pleaure, or increaſe the *power* of pleaſing, or the *will* to pleaſe; and we uſually take into our view the pleaſure

pleaſure of *others* as well as our own. Even the *external* circumſtances, in which we are placed, give riſe to like ſentiments, when they are thought capable of producing like effects. A man eſteems himſelf for his *wealth*, as well as for his wiſdom.—On the other hand, the power of giving *pain* to others, if that pain have become an object of deſire, is equally capable of producing ſelf-eſteem.

2. We *diſeſteem* ourſelves for any obſervable *deficiency* in ſuch qualities, or for any actions or qualities, which *diſable* us from doing good or harm, or which may probably be the *occaſions* of doing or ſuffering harm.

3. In like manner we are led to eſteem *others* from obſerving in them either agreeable or uſeful qualities, and to *diſeſteem* them from obſerving either a *want* of theſe, or an appearance of *oppoſite* qualities, viz. ſuch as make them leſs able, or leſs willing, to pleaſe.

The eſteem and diſeſteem of others is of two kinds. Qualities, which cauſe good only, excite *love*; qualities, which cauſe ill only, excite *hatred*. Thoſe which increaſe the

power, without determining the *application*, give riſe to *reſpect*: the oppoſite defects and qualities provoke *contempt*.

1. Since *love* ariſes towards thoſe, in whom we diſcern agreeable or uſeful qualities, we can be at no loſs to account for the different *kinds* of love. The love of our *acquaintance* proceeds from *frequent* pleaſure received; the love of *benefactors* (or gratitude) from *great* advantages conferred: and, ſince it is natural to be pleaſed with the regards of others, we readily make returns of love to thoſe who love *us*. The love of the *ſexes* is *founded* on ſenſual pleaſures; but *increaſed* by thoſe we receive from beauty, wit, or any other accompliſhment. The love of our *offspring* depends on the ſame principles. Nature indeed ſeems to have rendered our children pleaſing to us *antecedently* to any agreeable or uſeful qualities, they may happen to poſſeſs; which however are ſure not to eſcape the eye of a parent. This perhaps proceeds from the regard we have to *ourſelves*; which, by the power of aſſociation, is readily extended to every thing related to us. Doubtleſs the ſentiment is very much heightened by the

pleaſures

pleaſures our children *actually* give us, and the many more we *expect* to receive from them.

The occaſions of *hatred* are eaſily underſtood from what has been ſaid of its oppoſite. All qualities give birth to this paſſion, which are cauſes of *pain*: and as nothing is more painful than *contempt*, every appearance of this ſentiment is ſure to provoke reſentment. Whence ſome writers have repreſented ſuch appearances as the *only* ſource of of our malignant paſſions *. But this is a fanciful ſuppoſition, and unſupported by experience.—There is beſides *another* ſpecies of hatred, ariſing from *competition*: in which the phænomena are in a manner *inverted*; and hatred ariſes from the cuſtomary cauſes of reſpect and love.

To prevent miſtakes on this ſubject, it may be fit to obſerve, that even *inanimate* cauſes of pleaſure, as they cannot but pleaſe in imagination, are often ſaid to produce *love*; and *v. v.* But though the ſame word be uſed, the ſentiment is very diſtinguiſhable. When we ſpeak of loving *grapes*, or hating

* Ariſt. Rhet. lib. 2.

phyſic, our meaning is not the ſame, as when we ſpeak of loving our *children*, or hating a *tyrant*.

2. *Reſpect* ariſes from qualities or circumſtances capable of being applied either to good or ill. This ſentiment ſeldom riſes high, unleſs we diſcern a remarkable diſparity between others and ourſelves. Hence often proceeds an uneaſy reflection, which is apt to terminate in hatred.

Contempt ariſes from obſerving either a remarkable deficiency in ſuch qualities, or an appearance of other qualities inconſiſtent with them.

Before we quit this part of the ſubject, it ſhould be obſerved, that the eſteem a man obtains from others confirms him in the good opinion he had of himſelf; and therefore cannot fail of being acceptable to him. His ſelf-eſteem too is farther increaſed by ſympathy: and, on both accounts, *fame* (already an object of deſire, for the reaſon before given) is rendered ſtill more deſirable.

IV. *Of benevolence and malevolence.*

1. Benevolence is only a ſpecies of *ſympathy*.—*General* benevolence is a principle of little

little force*, unleſs when the imagination is ſtrongly impreſſed with the *pains* of others; in which caſe it takes the name of *compaſſion*. —Benevolence to *particular* perſons conſtantly attends *love*, of whatever kind, and, where there is no competition, is ſometimes alſo produced by *reſpect*.

2. *General* malevolence is a principle ſeldom, if ever, to be found in our nature.—Malevolence to particular perſons uſually reſults from the opinion we entertain of their characters and conduct. For this opinion, as we have ſeen, produces *hatred:* and hatred ſeldom exiſts, without ſome degree of ill-will. *Anger* may be conſidered as a ſpecies of hatred; ariſing (for the moſt part) from ſome apparent injury, and producing a ſtrong, but temporary, *malevolence*.—Malevolence, when independent on perſonal character, reſults from *compariſon*. We *envy* in others the goods we want, whether of nature or fortune: and we ſometimes feel a *malicious* pleaſure, in ſurveying thoſe evils, from which we ourſelves are free †.

* This is to be underſtood of its *immediate* influence: for *indirectly*, as it gives occaſion to *moral* ſentiments, it may have very conſiderable effect.

† The Greeks had a name for this principle as well as it's oppoſite. Φθόνος μὲν γάρ ἐστι λύπη ἐπ' ἀλλοτρίοις ἀγαθοῖς, ἐπιχαιρεκακία δὲ ἡδονὴ ἐπ' ἀλλοτρίοις κακοῖς. Plut. de Curioſ.

III. *Of*

III. *Of the Senſe of Honour.*

This ſentiment has been incidentally explained already: I only give it a place here, in conformity to the practice of other writers; for it is evidently included in the paſſions mentioned above. We have but to repeat, and unite, the conſiderations before ſuggeſted.

We receive pleaſure from the *belief*, or *imagination*, that we poſſeſs the eſteem of others, on two accounts: 1. Becauſe the good opinion of others confirms the opinion we have of ourſelves; and the eſteem of others, by the force of *ſympathy*, ſtrengthens our ſelf-eſteem: 2. Becauſe the principle of *aſſociation* has connected the eſteem of others with the *advantages* to be obtained from their friendſhip. The truth of this account will be ſeen by obſerving, *whoſe* eſteem it is that we value moſt: viz, their's, whoſe *opinion* has moſt weight, or whoſe *friendſhip* is ſuppoſed to be moſt uſeful.

On the other hand, we receive *pain* from the *contempt* or *diſlike* of others, as depriving us of both theſe advantages.—To this head belongs

belongs the paſſion of *ſhame*: which is only a diſeſteem of ourſelves, joined to a quick ſenſe of honour. The ſame ſenſe of honour, when joined with *ſelf-eſteem*, takes the name of *vanity*. In the one caſe we are anxious to avoid *diſgrace*, in the other to obtain *applauſe*.

IV. *Of the Moral Senſe.*

There is one kind of ſentiment ſtill to be added, which was deſigned for the regulation of all the reſt, *approbation* and *diſapprobation*. The power of receiving theſe ſentiments is called by ſome the *moral ſenſe*: by others, who ſeem to have thought the word *ſenſe* might be liable to a wrong interpretation, the *moral faculty*.—Call it what you pleaſe, there are certain *feelings* in the mind, the objects of which, and indeed the *peculiar* objects, are determinations of the *will*. Voluntary obedience to any uſeful principle of action, or voluntary reſiſtance to any hurtful principle, produces approbation; the contrary, diſapprobation *: perhaps from our *anticipating*

* It may be objected perhaps that *all* the principles in our nature may be ſhewn to be uſeful. They are ſo when not *abuſed*,

anticipating the good or ill which usually arise from such conduct, and *sympathizing* with those, who are supposed to enjoy the one, or suffer the other.—It is difficult to conceive, how it can have happened, that the *reality* of these sentiments should ever have been disputed. They are not indeed *innate:* for *no* sentiments are innate. But they are *common*, I suppose, to our whole species. There is not a nation upon earth, whose language wants words to express these feelings: probably there never was a single man, who was void of all perception of *right* and *wrong*.

The sentiment above-described is distinguishable from all others, not only by our inward consciousness, but by the following *marks* which are inseparable from it. It does not depend on the *success* of men's endeavours; but simply on the *intention* with which they act. It has no peculiar relation to *ourselves*; but rather gives a *preference* to

abused, i. e. misapplied, or excessive. They are so, in their proper *place*, i. e. not interfering with more extensive, or more important principles of action. In either of these cases, a good principle changes it's name and it's nature: and is no longer intitled to our regard and compliance.

other men, and principally regards the *general*-happineſs. It is conſtantly attended with another ſenſe, which may almoſt be conſidered as a part of it; the ſenſe of good and ill-*deſert*. Whoever *rewards* the man we approve, or *puniſhes* the man we diſapprove, becomes *himſelf* on that account an object of approbation.

Obſerve however that the moral ſentiment, as well as every other, may not only be produced by it's own *peculiar* cauſe, but alſo by *ſympathy*: and thus, in fact, it ſeems to be *firſt* introduced into every human mind.

Before we conclude this ſubject, it may be fit to take notice, that this ſenſe or faculty is not uſually numbered among the *paſſions*. Nay, on the contrary, it aſſumes very frequently the name of *reaſon*. Language is arbitrary, and therefore various. I can only ſay, that theſe *moral* feelings are, as much as any *other*, *modes of pleaſure and pain*, though perhaps leſs violent than the reſt. If you diſlike the words *ſenſe* and *paſſion*, uſe any other, that will expreſs the ſame *idea*; and it will ſerve the purpoſe equally well.

That

That we like or diſlike beneficial or hurtful *actions*; that theſe ſentiments lead us to like or diſlike the *agents*, if acting with deſign and choice; and that theſe agents are finally *approved* or *diſapproved*, as acting under the influence of good or bad *principles*: theſe only are the material points, which we mean to aſſert.

Recapitulation.

1. Some paſſions reſpect indifferently good and evil of all kinds, and all the various objects, which are capable of producing or preventing either.—Such are our deſires and averſions; hopes and fears; joys and ſorrows.

2. Other paſſions reſpect only *intelligent* cauſes of pleaſure or pain. Such are eſteem and diſeſteem; benevolence and malevolence; the ſenſe of honour and diſhonour; the ſenſe of moral good and evil.

3. All theſe paſſions are founded on this principle, that the image of pleaſure pleaſes, the image of pain diſpleaſes. They are drawn

drawn from this ſource, in various ways, by anticipation, compariſon, and ſympathy.

4. Theſe obſervations are applicable not only to other paſſions, but to the moral faculty itſelf: which may be conſidered as a *peculiar* ſpecies of eſteem and diſeſteem, confined to the determinations of the *will*.

END OF THE APPENDIX.

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